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SUMMARY 
 
Tax competition literature predicts a world where countries will suppress taxes on 
mobile capital to attract it from elsewhere. Do the countries of South East Asia interact 
with each other strategically and compete when setting corporate taxes or do they 
compete for capital through other incentives? Data was collected from World Bank and 
American Enterprise Institute to model the tax interaction across these countries as a 
spatially dependent process. Findings indicate that these countries compete in terms of 
taxes amongst themselves only to a limited extent, but try to attract capital through non-
tax incentives. Moreover, the spread of production processes by MNCs in these countries 
are such that they can act as a block to attract capital from the rest of the world, while not 
competing too much amongst them. 
 Does Soft Budget Constraint exist in Indian State finances? If it does what is its 
extent and how does it manifest itself? Using data from Reserve Bank of India and 
Ministry of Finance sources our analysis indicate that states in India do indeed enjoy the 
benefits of soft budget constraint and expect the Central government to bail them out 
through regular resource transfers. 
Can the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium of policy making explain the pattern of 
jumps and stasis in Indian state budgets? Or can explanations like political business cycle 
and forecast error correction be sufficient to explain such patterns? A detailed study of 
the annual budgetary changes indicate that although such competing explanations can 
partly explain the pattern, but still the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory is strongly 
applicable in explaining the leptokurtic pattern of annual budgetary changes in India.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Strategic interaction across governments – both vertically and horizontally – 
creates externalities. Tax competition literature has long predicted a global race to the 
bottom in terms of corporate taxes while the literature on soft budget constraint point to 
strategic interaction across government as the source of the softening of the budget 
constraints. Both of these phenomena can be thought of as negative externalities 
originating from the strategic interactions. In this dissertation I have looked at the 
empirical evidence of such strategic interaction.  
In the first essay, I have searched for strategic interaction corporate tax policy 
among the countries of south East Asia. This is part and extension of the scholarship 
about corporate tax interaction in EU and OECD countries. My first question was 
whether we can find empirical evidence of strategic interaction among the countries of 
South East Asia and my second question was whether this interaction, if found, is of 
Nash or Stackelberg type. I used spatial dynamic autoregressive panel model for the 
analysis. There is evidence of interaction but there is no clear leader in my sample. Of 
course China, Japan, and South Korea could well be the leaders if we expand the region, 
but those countries are vastly different from my sample. However, there is evidence that 
the countries in my sample are competing through non-tax incentives to attract capital. 
Finally, an analysis of the trade patterns among these countries indicates one important 
pattern. The trade among these countries is in intermediate goods, which means MNCs 
are spreading their production process across the region and taking benefit of transfer 
pricing mechanisms. 
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In my second essay, I have searched for empirical evidence of Soft Budget 
Constraint in Indian state budgets. Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) exists when any state 
consistently behaves in a fiscally irresponsible way and believes that resource transfer 
from the center will bail it out. There have been allegations that SBC exists in Indian 
state budgets but yet no empirical attempt to search for its evidence. I looked for evidence 
of strategic behavior of states with respect to both Finance Commission and erstwhile 
Planning Commission. At the same time I also searched for evidence of states trying to 
replicate neighboring states in their incurring of deficits. The idea is that if SBC is there 
then State A would think well state B is not being punished for deficits then why should I 
be. There is clear evidence of SBC. Moreover it is not stemming from a mimicking 
behavior in sector specific expenditures. 
Finally the third essay looks at Indian state budget through the lens of Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory (PET). Can this theory be applied to Indian policy making in general 
and budgets in particular? The answer that I found is yes it does. The year to year change 
in budgeted revenue expenditure is strongly consistent with the leptokurtic pattern 
predicted by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of policy making. Moreover, forecast error 
correction and other explanations like political business cycle, although explains part of 
the pattern, but still cannot completely substitute PET as the explanation to the year to 
year budget changes. 
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Chapter 2: Essay 1 – In Search of Strategic Interaction in Corporate 
Tax among the Countries of South East Asia 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Over the last couple of decades the pattern of global integration has meant that 
both commodities and factors of production (including Foreign Direct Investment or FDI) 
have become increasingly more mobile across borders (Hines Jr., 2005; Frankel, 1992, 
1993; Obstfeld, 1993). Not only has FDI become more mobile across borders, its 
responsiveness to tax policy has also become high. Studies trying to estimate the 
responsiveness of FDI to yearly changes in after-tax rates of return generally find that the 
elasticity of FDI with respect to after-tax returns is close to unity (Hines Jr., 2005). 
Hartman (1984), Boskin & Gale, (1987), Young (1988), Murthy (1989), Grubert and 
Mutti (1991), and Hines and Rice (1994) among others have all found that FDI has been 
or become quite tax sensitive across the world. Altshuler, Grubert, & Newlon (2002) 
estimates that the tax sensitivity of FDI has increased over the period 1984-1992. 
According to the estimates of Altshuler and Grubert (2004) this elasticity seems to have 
continued to increase over time. Other studies that have found similar effects of taxes on 
FDI include Hines (1996), and Gorter and Parikh (2000). Globalization is thus making 
government policies across countries interdependent. This interdependence across 
countries especially in the context of corporate and income tax and specifically for the 
countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
European Union has elicited both theoretical and practical interests.  Large bodies of both 
theoretical research (see for example Zodrow, 2003 or Wilson, 1999 for surveys) and 
empirical research (see for example Griffith and Klemm, 2004, Genschel, 2011, or Adam 
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et. al., 2013 for surveys) have developed to study and understand these issues. The 
conclusions reached by the theoretical literature are that the tax burden on capital is likely 
to be lower in relatively smaller countries, while the burden on the immobile factors such 
as labor and land is likely to be higher. It has also been concluded that the constraint on 
tax revenue implies that social services loose out vis-a-vis infrastructural spending as 
countries tend to compete with each other through the improvement of available public 
inputs. The evidences found by the empirical works are however mixed. Some find that 
there is a strong indication that corporate tax policies in these countries are strategic 
complements of each other, while others do not find any such evidence. Nevertheless, the 
prospect of sovereign countries of EU losing control over a traditional source of tax 
revenue has caught the attention of the policy makers in Europe, and elsewhere.  
There are several ingenious ways to avoid the tax burden of capital and corporate 
taxes in a high tax country. In addition to actually shifting physical capital (which is a 
time consuming process), multinationals often engage in tax avoidance activities like – 
debt financing, profit shifting, and transfer pricing (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998). 
Evidences from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study (Gropp & Kostial, 2001) 
show that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) spend a substantial amount of economic 
resources in tax planning (for example employing consultancy companies to determine 
transfer pricing) which can reduce their global tax liabilities. By using debt instead of 
equity financing multinationals can reduce the tax burden on subsidiaries in countries 
with higher corporate tax rates. The amount of debt in the financial structure of the 
subsidiary determines the interest payment to the parent unit which is generally 
deductible for the purposes of tax calculation in most countries and a high interest 
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payment reduces the tax payable. Hines and Hubbard (1990), Grubert (1998), and Desai 
et. al. (2004) among others find evidence that American multinationals engage in these 
financial restructuring of their affiliates and subsidiaries. The subsidiaries, which are debt 
financed (or have high debt levels), are more often located in high tax countries relative 
to the subsidiaries which are equity financed. Although these studies use data from US 
multinationals, there is no logical reason to suspect that multinationals from other 
industrialized countries will behave any differently. All in all these studies support the 
conjecture that the flow of foreign capital and the business practices pursued by 
Multinational investors are responsive to tax policies of the countries where they are 
operating. According to OECD estimates these types of activities result in annual global 
losses of anywhere between 4-10 percent of global Corporate Income Tax. The OECD is 
attempting to prevent such exploitation of the tax rules through its Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. Not only within the OECD, the BEP initiative is trying 
to engage the developing countries as well. 
All these evidences of increasing mobility of capital across border and capital’s 
responsiveness to corporate tax rates have given rise to the possibility of countries or sub-
national jurisdictions within countries (as in the case of some federal countries) 
competing with each other in terms of tax rates to attract the footloose capital1
                                            
1 As an addition weak point, the developing and transition countries also suffer from weak 
tax administration leading to inadequacy of tax revenue for the running of the governments. 
Therefore, the alleged ills of tax competition are far more severe for developing and 
transition countries. 
. The 
creation of regional blocs like Andean Community and MERCOSUR in South America, 
ECOWAS in West Africa and ASEAN in South East Asia is shaping and reshaping the 
pattern of international trade and movement of capital. Thus the analysis of tax 
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competition and strategic interaction within these blocs has become important issues for 
serious consideration. Although the issue of strategic interaction in corporate tax has been 
widely studied in the context of EU, there have been fewer studies for other comparable 
supra national associations and regions of the world. 
In particular, the south-east Asian countries have been destinations of footloose 
capital for last two decades. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in these countries has not 
only created new tax bases but has also been the engine of rapid growth. The countries in 
this region have increasingly become the manufacturing hub of the world. Cheap labor in 
conjunction with encouraging industrial policies has drawn both newer technology 
industries and traditional industries (for example textile) to this region. However, we do 
not know much about the tax interaction among these countries and geopolitical entities2
 
. 
What does the experience of European Union countries in terms of interdependency of 
corporate tax setting has to offer to these countries? To bridge this gap the main goal of 
this paper is to empirically investigate whether there is evidence of strategic interaction in 
corporate taxes among the countries and geopolitical entities of the south east Asian 
region.  
2.2. Literature Review  
 
Oates (1972)3
                                            
2 In this region we have Hong Kong SAR which is part of China and although is not a 
country, but still maintains its own tax rates. 
3 Tiebout (1956) also addresses tax competition but in a different vein. 
 first informally discussed the interjurisdictional competition for 
capital. It was, however, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) who gave a 
formal treatment to interjurisdictional tax competition and its effects. This seminal 
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model, which is sometimes referred to as the WZM model, gave rise to a substantial body 
of both theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition and its effects. This 
‘classical’ literature on tax competition argued that when there is an immobile factor of 
production available (which many interpreted as labor) then a source-based tax on the 
mobile factor (which was interpreted as capital) is inefficient and results in flight of the 
mobile factor (henceforth capital). With the jurisdictions being ‘small’ or price takers, the 
capital flight will continue till the after tax return in the domestic economy is equalized 
with the net return to capital on foreign economies (Gordon, 1986; Razin and Sadka, 
1991). The natural corollary to this line of argument is that the economies being aware of 
this possibility will reduce capital tax rates to zero (since all jurisdictions are assumed to 
be identical) and a ‘race to the bottom’ would ensue. In a different context even the 
optimal tax literature says that zero tax rate on mobile capital is the efficient rate for 
small open economies (Diamond and Mirrless, 1971). Moreover, countries with non-zero 
taxes on foreign investment are predicted to have lower incomes than other countries. 
The simple nature of the logic of the WZM model and the policy initiatives that 
started in Europe would lead an unsuspecting observer to believe that the research on tax 
competition is unequivocal about the negative effects of tax competition. However, in 
reality that has not been the case. Looking closely (Zodrow, 2003) we can see that the 
WZM model crucially depends on several standard but simplifying assumptions. These 
include the price taking nature of the jurisdictions (countries or subnational regions), a 
Nash type single period interaction between jurisdictions, fixed supply of factors in each 
jurisdiction, identical tastes and preferences for all residents in each jurisdictions, a single 
final commodity, benevolent governments providing a “private” good from the tax 
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revenues without any spillover, greenfield type capital investment, and only two policy 
instruments – taxes on capital and head taxes on labor. Once these assumptions are 
relaxed to make the WZM model more complex the policy conclusions of the expanded 
models become more nuanced and less unequivocal. 
The empirical literature on the existence of tax competition can be grouped into 
‘first generation’ studies and ‘second generation’ studies. The first generation studies 
start by taking the mobility of capital as given. They implicitly assumed if a country have 
fewer restrictions on capital then a measure of openness can be taken as a proxy of the 
mobility of capital. And if it is found that the measure of openness of the economy 
(which stands as a proxy for the mobility of capital) negatively affects some measure of 
corporate tax rate or revenue then one can conclude that there exists tax competition. 
Even within the ‘first generation’ studies we can differentiate between two strands – first 
are the older studies (Garrett, 1995; Quinn, 1997; Slemrod, 2003; Kenny and Winner, 
2006) that used the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP as the dependent variable and 
the later studies that started using relatively more sophisticated measures of effective tax 
rates (Rodrik, 1997; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Hays, 2003; Winner 2005; Adam and 
Kammas, 2007). Interestingly, the first group of studies that use the ratio of corporate tax 
revenue to GDP as the dependent variable fail to find any evidence in favor of tax 
competition. The use of this particular dependent variable has been criticized because an 
increase in tax revenue may result from expansion of base and better tax administration 
even if the rates are reduced to reduce the burden on each unit of capital. The second 
group of studies thus used measures of average and marginal tax rates (following the 
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work of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar, 1994) and started finding that openness is negatively 
related to different measures of effective tax on capital. 
Contrary to what many would like us to believe this literature does not always 
invariably find that empirical evidence supports the existence of tax competition (even 
the ‘openness leading to lower taxes means competition’ type). Several studies using 
measures of effective taxes similar to the above studies have found that openness can lead 
to higher effective taxes on capital (Dreher, 2006; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Gellany 
and McCoy, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2006). 
In effect what these ‘first generation’ studies enquire about is what factors 
(including openness) affect the ex-post tax revenue or some measure of it. They do not 
directly estimate the reaction of each country’s tax rate (or some indicator of it) to the 
changes in neighbor’s tax rates (or some indicator of it). In other words these studies do 
not analyze the ‘strategic interaction’ among countries per se. 
The ‘second generation’ studies on the other hand try to incorporate this ‘strategic 
interaction’ by estimating the effect of neighbor’s (or other countries’) tax rates on the 
measure of the tax rate of the home country or jurisdiction (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 
1998; Buettner, 2001; Feld and Reulier 2009, Bordignon et al. 2003; Brett and Pinske, 
2000 etc.). There are mainly two types of empirical studies that incorporate the strategic 
interaction among countries in terms of tax competition. The two types follow closely the 
early ‘strategic interaction’ models in the theoretical literature. On the one hand we have 
the empirical papers that assume the countries to behave as Nash competitors and 
incorporate some measure of weighted tax from the neighboring or competing countries 
into the explanatory variables (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). On the other, 
10 
 
we have the studies that take the Stackelberg leader-follower model as the starting point 
and incorporate some measure of lagged tax rate of the alleged leader country into the 
explanatory variables (see Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2011 for theoretical analyses and Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014, Altshuler and 
Goodspeed, 2014, for empirical studies). The empirical studies that try to incorporate 
strategic interactions among countries (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Overesch and 
Rincke, 2009; Redoano, 2003 and 2007) find that corporate taxes are strategically set by 
the economies in their samples. I have not found any empirical study yet to incorporate 
the repeated interaction among countries. Given the infancy of the theoretical literature 
itself this is not something that should surprise us much. 
The current literature focuses mainly on OECD or EU countries (either at national 
level across countries, or at subnational and local levels within countries) or on the states 
of USA. There are only a few studies for the developing countries and regional country 
associations other than OECD or EU (for example Chen, Huang and Regis, 2014, IMF, 
2014, and Suzuki, 2013). However, for regional groups like ASEAN the issue of tax 
competition and strategic interaction in tax setting is likely equally salient.  
In this paper I attempt to test the existence of strategic interaction in setting 
corporate taxes among the ASEAN countries and also to explore the possibility that any 
of the countries within this regional block behaving like a Stackelberg leader. Although 
the above three works have tried to explore the issue of tax interaction among the 
countries included in ASEAN (among other countries in their sample), none of them have 
attempted to test for the existence of a Stackelberg leader in this region. 
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2.3. Empirical Specification  
 
The empirical strategy of the current literature on tax competition is the estimate a 
tax reaction function. The tax reaction function expresses a country's tax measure as a 
function of the tax measures of neighboring countries and other country specific control 
variables. The standard (Devereux et. al. 2008, Brueckner, 2003, Jacobs et al. 2010, Liu 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014) baseline model is the spatial autoregressive or spatial lag 
(Anselin, 1988) model of the form: 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖…….. (1) 
Where zit is the measure of the tax rate in country i in year t, wij are weights that 
indicate the relevance of other jurisdictions in the process of interaction, Xit is the matrix 
of country characteristic variables (entered with one period lag signified by the subscript 
t-1) , and εit is an independently and identically distributed error.  This simple spatial 
autoregressive model assumes that the characteristics of country j do not directly affect 
the tax variable in country i. The own lagged tax measure 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is included in the model 
to account for the time persistence of tax policy. The other control variables (included in 
the matrix 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) are explained later. We also include a country fixed effect and a time 
trend. Ideally we would also like to include time fixed effects, but as noted in Devereux 
et al (2008) that after the inclusion of time dummies in a model of spatial lag the true 
impact of the control variables cannot be separately identified. 
Taxes enter both the right and left hand sides of the reaction function. This gives 
rise to the possibility of endogeneity. There are three ways to address this issue. First, we 
can use Maximum Likelihood based estimation (Case et al. 1993; Brueckner and 
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Saavedra, 2001) using an inverted equation derived from the original model, which is 
computationally much more cumbersome compared to the other two methods. Otherwise, 
we can use an estimated instrument in lieu of the weighted sum of taxes and use an 
Instrumental Variable based two stage least square (2SLS) estimation. Finally, we can 
use all explanatory variables (including the weighted tax rate of neighbor’s) with a one or 
two period lag and circumvent the problem of endogeneity all together (Hayashi & 
Boadway, 2001). However, the limited application of this method indicates that a 
completely temporally lagged model is less accepted as a good way to deal with 
endogeneity. Therefore, In this paper we have adopted the 2SLS method using 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. 
We have augmented the model by adding a temporally lagged variable which make 
the model a temporally dynamic model along with being spatially dynamic. We estimate 
our models using the GMM framework which implies our estimates would not be biased 
even if we do not specifically model the spatial error dependence. (See for example Liu 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). 
In addition to the Nash model (equation 1 above) we have also explored the 
possibility of one of the countries in the sample behaving like a Stackelberg leader. To 
test the existence of a Stackelberg leader we have followed the procedure of Altshuler 
and Goodspeed (2014) and have augmented the basic equation (1) as follows, 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾 ′ ∑ 𝑤𝑤 ′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖……. (2) 
Here, 𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 is the one period lagged tax rate of the alleged leader country. This 
equation uses a weight matrix which excludes the leader country in the computation of 
the weighted neighbors’ tax measure (∑ 𝑤𝑤 ′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 ). 
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As noted earlier, the two model specifications in (1) and (2) introduce two crucial 
elements of endogeneity. First the introduction of the temporally lagged own tax rate is 
correlated with the state fixed effects in the composite error term (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ). Secondly, the 
introduction of the spatially lagged tax rate of the neighbors (which enters our models 
contemporaneously) makes the tax policy variable endogenous and to be correlated with 
the error term. In the presence of these endogeneity problems we cannot use OLS or fixed 
effects estimators. We therefore employ the Blundell and Bond (1998)4 GMM based 
dynamic panel data estimator. This estimator takes care of the first endogeneity problem. 
To address the endogeneity problem associated with the spatially lagged variable we 
follow the spatial econometrics literature and use exogenous instruments (spatially 
weighted explanatory variables)5
The computation of the weighted average of the neighbor’s tax measures requires 
the use of weight matrices. One would like to estimate the weights endogenously along 
with the explanatory variable coefficients. But empirically this is not possible due the loss 
of degrees of freedom. Therefore the methodological strategy employed by the extant 
literature is to assume a particular a priori structure of the weight matrix. This assumption 
is an ad hoc condition imposed on the nature of the possible interaction across 
jurisdictions. The weights are row standardized so that they sum to one for each 
observation (country). Several different types of weights have been used in the literature 
. The serial correlations in the residuals are evaluated 
using the Arellano and Bond (1991) test. 
                                            
4 This estimator is also known as the system GMM estimator. There is also a slightly older 
but estimator based on Arellano and Bond (1991) which is known as the difference GMM. 
5 The estimations are done using xtabond2 estimation command developed by Roodman 
(2009) for Stata statistical program. 
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by varying the a priori assumption about the nature of the interaction. These different 
weighting schemes include, 
• Inverse of the Geographical Distance or Proximity Weights (Altshuler and 
Goodspeed, 2007; Hernandez-Murilo, 2003) which derive their inspiration from the 
Gravity Models of Trade or Equal Contiguity Weights.  
• GDP weights (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008) 
• Equal weights (Garretson and Peeters, 2007; Redoano, 2007; Dreher, 2006; 
Haufler, Klemm and Schjelderup, 2006) 
• Demographic similarity weight (Case et. al. 1993) 
• Or a mixture of some more that one schemes above (Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2014) 
The sample region (South East Asia) is a compact geopolitical region with only a 
few countries. We do not expect any one country making much distinction between the 
neighboring countries when it comes to the question of interaction, unless some particular 
country (or geopolitical entity) functions as a Stackelberg leader. Therefore, except for 
the equations where we have explored the possibility of the existence of Stackelberg 
leader, we have taken equal weights. However, we have used a second weighting scheme 
to check the robustness of my baseline results. This second weighting scheme uses both 
geographical and GDP similarity and dissimilarity as factors in the weights (Liu and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). The underlying logic is what runs under all spatial analysis – 
‘closer’ entities are likely to compete more. These weights are created by multiplying the 
inverse of the geographical (air travel distance to capital or main airport) distance 
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between with the inverse of the absolute difference in per capita GDP. The baseline 
results do not qualitatively change at all with this alternative scheme, and hence in the 
estimations for the Stackelberg models we have used only equal uniform weights. The 
next section discusses the computation of the dependent variables and the different 
explanatory and control variables. 
 
2.4. Data and Variables  
 
The empirical specification used for this paper estimates a tax reaction function 
where the dependent variable is a measure of corporate tax rate. The two dependent 
variables that we have used in this analysis are the statutory tax rate (STR) and the 
effective average tax rate (EATR). Statutory tax rate is expected to affect where the 
MNCs declare profits. Through profit shifting and using transfer pricing MNCs declare 
profit where the statutory tax rate is the lowest. On the other hand, following Devereux 
and Griffith (1998, 2003) we argue that the policy variable that is important for the 
location decision for new investment decision is the EATR. Thus competition in terms of 
STR can be interpreted as competition over paper profit, while competition in terms of 
EATR can be interpreted as competition over location decision of new investment.  
In large parts of the existing empirical literature (especially in the earlier literature) 
the so called ‘backward looking’ measures of average and marginal taxation on capital 
have been used due to lack of better measures6
                                            
6These backward looking measures are generally called the Average Effective Tax Rate 
(AETR) and Average Marginal Tax Rate (AMTR). 
. However, investors and decision makers 
within firms can realistically be expected to consider expected future tax payments 
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instead of some historical measure of tax payment (as measured by the backward looking 
tax measures AETR and AMTR) when deciding about new investment and location of 
new investment. EATR is such a forward looking measure of taxation. To some extent 
EATR can capture the various aspects of the tax system better than the simple statutory 
tax rate. However, at the same time we also note that for the governments it is the 
statutory tax rate on capital that is the most obvious and visible policy variable. The 
entire inspiration for the tax competition literature was (and still is) derived from the 
alleged interdependent changes in statutory tax rates across countries. Therefore inclusion 
of statutory tax rate in the analysis seems only natural. 
By definition the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) measures the proportion of 
total income taken in tax from a hypothetical investment project. Thus this is defined as 
the scaled difference between the project's net present values (NPV) in the absence and in 
the presence of a tax. There are two choices for the scaling factor. The first is the net 
present value of the pre-tax total income stream, net of depreciation, and the second is the 
net present value of the economic rent (the NPV of the project in the absence of tax). 
Devereux and Griffith (2003) in their original paper prefer the former measure and here 
we have followed their approach. Klemm (2008) has also shown that EATR as defined 
by Devereux and Griffith (2003) pertains to a one period perturbation to the capital stock 
where the investment is sold in the second period. Klemm (2008) thus derives an 
expression of EATR for a permanent perturbation to the capital stock. This is the EATR 
measure that we have used as the dependent variable in my analysis and it is computed as 
follows. Let, δ denote the rate of depreciation, ρ the real financial return, r and i be the 
real and nominal rates of interest respectively, R* the NPV of the project when there is 
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no tax, and R is the NPV when there is tax at the rate z. Moreover, let φ be the rate at 
which capital expenditure can be offset against tax which is conditional on the type of 
capital employed. When the project is completely debt financed then, using the above 
notations we get7
                                            
7 The other measure of EATR (the EATRR of Devereux and Griffith, 2003) would be 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸∗−𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸∗
, where the scaling factor is the NPV of the project in the absence of the tax. The EATRR 
remains the same whether we consider a one period or a permanent perturbation to the 
capital stock. 
, 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 =  𝐸𝐸∗ − 𝐸𝐸
𝑝𝑝 (𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿)⁄  
Where, 
𝐸𝐸∗ = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟) (𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿)⁄  
 
and, assuming that the financing of the investment is done using retained earning only, 
𝐸𝐸 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿)(1 + 𝜋𝜋)(1 − 𝑧𝑧)
𝜌𝜌 − 𝜋𝜋 + 𝛿𝛿(1 + 𝜋𝜋) −  1 + 𝐸𝐸 
 
where, A is the present discounted value of depreciation allowances multiplied by 
the tax rate (z). The calculation of A is contingent upon whether a country’s tax system 
allows for straight-line depreciation or declining balance depreciation. In my sample we 
have both types of depreciation allowances. For the declining balance method A is 
calculated as, 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌 + 𝑧𝑧 
while, for the straight line method it is, 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1 + 𝜌𝜌)
𝜌𝜌
(1 − ( 11 + 𝜌𝜌)1 𝜌𝜌⁄ ) 
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Derivation of the above compact expressions for R, R* and A involves several 
simplifying but commonly made assumptions in the literature. First we ignore any 
personal taxes. Second, we assume that the entire project is financed by retained earnings 
and is in plant and machinery. 
Furthermore, we are making the following assumptions regarding the values of the 
parameters in the calculation of EATR. The economic depreciation rate is assumed to be 
12.5 percent. In major part of the empirical literature the real rate of interest is generally 
assumed to be ten percent. However, we have calculated the applicable value of the real 
interest rate from the nominal interest rate and an assumed rate of inflation of 3.5 percent. 
The expected rate of economic profit is ten percent. With the above assumptions rate of 
financial return becomes equal to the nominal interest rate. The tax rates relevant for the 
above studies are collected from the KPMG's Corporate Tax Rate Survey (1993-2006), 
from the Corporate Tax Rate Tables from KPMG website and from the American 
Enterprise Institute’s International Tax Database. The AEI tax data base also has 
information about the value of capital allowance and the applicable method (straight line 
vs. declining balance) for the countries. The value of A appropriate for each country for 
each year of our sample is calculated using these two pieces of information. The nominal 
interest rate data is collected from World Bank’s World Development Indicator Database. 
The control variables that we have included in the model follow the well-
established prior research (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008; Altshuler and 
Goodspeed, 2014 etc.). All of these variables are entered with one period lag. These are 
government consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP, proportion of young (less 
than 14 years) and proportion of old (older than 65 years) people in the total population 
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as a percentage of working population (dependency ratio), population density, proportion 
of urban population and openness of the economy. The countries and geopolitical entities 
in our sample differ from each other widely. On the one hand we have resource rich 
countries like Indonesia and on the other we have Singapore and Hong Kong which have 
hardly any natural resource. According to Rogers (2002) these natural resource poor 
countries and entities have thrived due to their governments’ policies of attracting 
businesses and capital by providing a preferential treatment for capital. Therefore to 
capture the effect of the availability of natural resources on tax interaction we have 
included the rent from natural resources earned by these countries as a percentage of their 
GDP as a new explanatory variable. The source of data is the World Bank's World 
Development Indicator database8
 
.  
ASEAN currently includes ten countries - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The South East 
Asia region has one more member country – East Timor. Other geo-political entities in 
this region are Macao and Hong Kong (two Special Administrative Regions of China) 
and Taiwan. Lack of availability of comparable and dependable data has limited our 
sample to Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam - for the nineteen year period 1993-2012. The following section discusses 
the results and findings of our analysis. 
 
                                            
8 Accessed during May, 2014, September 2014 and August 2015. 
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2.5. Results and Discussion 
 
Tables 1 and 2 along with Figures 1 and 2 sets out a broad picture of what has 
happened to the Statutory Tax Rate (STR) and Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) in 
our sample over the better part of last two decades. Table 1 gives the sample average rate, 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation for each year. Table 2 shows the average 
rate and percentage decline in both STR and EATR for each country separately along 
with their sample counterparts.  
  The average STR has declined more compared to the average EATR in our 
sample. This is not surprising given that EATR incorporates the effect of inflation rate 
along with the STR and reflects the changes in other policy variables (for example the 
allowance rate) and economic factors (lending interest rate or nominal interest rate). 
However, these reductions in either STR or EATR have not been without any reversal. 
During 2005-2007 STR and during 1999-2002 EATR showed some tendency of increase. 
As depicted later in Figure 1, the increasing tendency of STR was mainly driven by a 
temporary increase in STR by Philippines and Hong Kong. The increase in EATR, on the 
other hand, was due the rise in EATR (resulting from other macroeconomic variables) in 
almost all countries in our sample which was most likely the result of the 1997 financial 
crisis9
                                            
9 To capture the effect of the 1997 South Asian Financial crisis I tried to test for a structural 
break during 1998-1999. However, using a simple dummy did not change the results. On the 
other hand a fully fledged test required testing for interaction of each explanatory variable 
with the time dummy (pre and post crisis) which was not possible due to the sample size. 
Moreover, the countries did not increase the statutory rates during or in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. 
. 
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Table 2.1: Average, Standard Deviation (SD) and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of 
EATR and STR 
Year 
Average 
STR 
SD of 
STR 
CV of 
STR 
average 
EATR 
SD of 
EATR 
CV of 
EATR 
1993 31.06 6.78 21.84 27.40 6.20 22.62 
1994 30.69 6.98 22.76 27.32 7.06 25.83 
1995 29.19 5.81 19.89 25.33 5.79 22.84 
1996 29.06 5.87 20.20 25.30 5.81 22.98 
1997 29.06 5.87 20.20 25.24 6.16 24.39 
1998 28.31 5.34 18.85 23.95 5.77 24.08 
1999 28.13 5.36 19.05 25.49 5.89 23.13 
2000 28.00 5.24 18.70 25.93 6.32 24.40 
2001 27.94 5.27 18.85 26.42 5.26 19.90 
2002 27.81 5.34 19.22 26.68 5.43 20.37 
2003 27.69 5.20 18.79 26.70 5.34 20.01 
2004 26.94 5.25 19.50 26.10 5.54 21.22 
2005 26.94 5.25 19.50 25.71 6.13 23.84 
2006 27.31 5.75 21.05 25.78 6.38 24.75 
2007 27.19 5.74 21.13 25.96 6.33 24.40 
2008 26.81 6.14 22.90 25.60 6.38 24.92 
2009 24.75 5.07 20.49 24.01 5.39 22.45 
2010 24.00 5.08 21.16 23.22 5.34 23.02 
2011 23.81 5.13 21.53 22.86 5.37 23.48 
2012 22.94 4.48 19.51 22.28 5.12 22.97 
 
 
 
In our sample Hong Kong consistently has the lowest rate. Its rates are lower than 
that of even Singapore which is the lowest STR country in ASEAN. In this respect Hong 
Kong is like the Ireland of this region. Only in recent years have Hong Kong’s EATR 
been converging to the Singapore rate. Vietnam had the highest rate (around 40%) in the 
region and is one of the three countries (other two being Singapore and Malaysia) which 
have reduced their tax rates regularly during our sample period. Although Vietnam had 
the highest STR, but its EATR has been much lower (and stayed stable) compared to 
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Indonesia which had the highest EATR at the beginning of our sample. Thailand and 
Brunei on the other hand kept their STR much more stable and resisted pressures from 
falling rates elsewhere (Singapore etc.) in the sample. The reduction in STR by 
Singapore, followed by Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam has prompted some authors to 
conclude that there is evidence of partial tax competition in terms of STR in this region 
(Tohari & Retnawati, 2010, p. 56). Although there is some indication that some of the 
countries in our sample are converging towards a similar STR but the movement in 
EATR depicts a different story. In terms of EATR movement we do not see any clear 
pattern emerging other than slight indication of divergence. As we will see later, the 
policy that these countries are currently pursuing to attract capital and to maintain a stable 
tax revenue from corporate taxes involve more emphasis on negotiating and signing 
bilateral Double Tax Avoidance (both within and outside the region) and creating 
regulatory mechanisms for transfer pricing schemes adopted by MNCs. Moreover, the 
higher tax rates in larger countries like Indonesia, and much lower rates in Singapore and 
Hong Kong follows the prediction of size-asymmetric jurisdictions’ tax interaction 
(Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991).  
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Table 2.2: Reduction in Statutory Tax Rates 
 Statutory Tax Rate Effective Average Tax Rate 
 Average Rate (%) % Reduction  Average Rate (%) % Reduction  
Brunei 28.65 26.67 29.25 25.08 
Hong Kong 16.75 5.71 14.18 0.42 
Indonesia 29.65 28.57 29.53 29.80 
Malaysia 28.05 26.47 25.69 12.76 
Philippines 32.95 14.29 30.34 0.60 
Singapore 22.50 37.03 20.84 39.00 
Thailand 29.65 23.33 26.21 12.47 
Vietnam 30.85 37.50 26.84 21.49 
Sample 27.38 26.16 25.36 18.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Movement of Statutory Tax Rate 
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Figure 2.2: Movement of Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) 
 
 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3, 4A and 4B below. The dependent 
variable for each model is noted as the column heading for each model – either EATR or 
STR. In most of our models only the coefficients on the spatially lagged tax rate and own 
lagged tax rates are statistically significant10
                                            
10 Similar results have been found by Suzuki (2013) in an unpublished paper using a slightly 
different dataset as well.  
. Tables 3 reports results from the 
estimations where we assume that there is no Stackelberg leader present in our sample 
and tax setting takes place in a Nash game. The coefficient on openness variable is 
positive in all the specifications. This contradicts the results of research done using EU 
and OECD data. Relatively more open economies generally tend to have lower tax rates, 
but in our sample the result seems to be that more open jurisdictions have higher taxes – 
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both EATR and STR. Jurisdictions with higher proportion of dependent population tend 
to have higher expenditure needs, and hence higher tax rates. As expected public 
expenditure has a positive coefficient as well. Finally own lagged interest rate is always 
large and statistically significant. This was expected as tax policy always shows a 
remarkable level of time consistency. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Estimations Results for Nash Interaction, Equal Weights 
 Effective Average Tax Rate Statutory Tax Rate 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2A) 
VARIABLES EATR EATR STR STR 
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate  0.409** 0.404* 0.300 0.300 
 (0.173) (0.188) (0.221) (0.208) 
Own Lagged Tax Rate 0.533*** 0.534*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.0916) (0.0777) 
Dependency Ratio 0.0699 0.0672 0.0606 0.0606 
 (0.103) (0.0869) (0.0587) (0.0515) 
Population Density 0.0136 0.0197 -0.0191 -0.0191 
 (0.0633) (0.0552) (0.0666) (0.0306) 
Urban Population 0.0646 0.0646 0.0459 0.0459 
 (0.0883) (0.0880) (0.0627) (0.0632) 
Government Expenditure 0.0106 0.0113 0.00169 0.00169 
 (0.0165) (0.0212) (0.0154) (0.0167) 
Openness 0.0100 0.0103 0.00519 0.00519 
 (0.0151) (0.0174) (0.0126) (0.0121) 
Per Capita Real GDP -0.00750 -0.00700 0.000416 0.000413 
 (0.0463) (0.0453) (0.0266) (0.0258) 
Rent from Natural Resources 0.000386 0.000388 0.000707*** 0.000707*** 
 (0.000263) (0.000265) (0.000127) (0.000127) 
Time Trend Yes No Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 144 
Number of Countries 8 8 8 8 
First Stage F Stats  24.23a 38.15b 60.11 a 30.90 b 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0205 0.0196 0.0329 0.0482 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.187 0.191 0.912 0.912 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: DF = (10,8), b: DF = (9,8) 
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The estimated coefficient on the Spatial Lag variable is of primary importance here. 
For EATR, the estimated coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically 
significant. Borrowing the Devereaux, Griffith, and Redoano (2008) interpretation, 
(Model 1A, table 3) this result implies that a one percentage point expected increase in 
the ‘average’ tax rate of other jurisdictions in the region results in a 0.41 percentage point 
increase in EATR of each jurisdiction. This result is robust to the introduction or 
omission of a time trend (models 1B and 2B). Thus there is some evidence that the 
jurisdictions in our sample respond strategically to each other’s effective tax rate to 
attract new investment. However, the coefficient on neighbor’s STR although is positive, 
but is not statistically significant. Only if we exclude the variable ‘rent from natural 
resources’ from the set of explanatory variables that this coefficient becomes significant. 
The (positive) coefficient on the rent from natural resources is statistically significant in 
determining the statutory tax rate but is not a significant determining factor for EATR. 
This implies that in our sample countries with higher rents from natural resources can 
maintain higher tax rates. On the one hand natural resources in those countries tend to 
attract capital in spite of higher taxes. On the other, the lost potential revenue from newer 
corporate tax bases is not felt due to the cushioning effect of these rents. If we are willing 
to model the interaction as a Nash Game then our data gives evidence that effective 
average tax rates are “strategic complements” while on an average statutory tax rates are 
determined by the historical pattern of own taxes and other conditions of the specific 
country in question. 
However, the Nash interaction is just an a prioi assumption imposed on the 
unknown interaction across jurisdictions. In tables 4A and 4B, we have presented the 
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results of the estimations in search of a Stackelberg leader in this region. Here I have 
tested the possibility of each jurisdiction acting as the Stackelberg leader. The alleged 
leader country’s tax rate is excluded from the calculation of the Spatially Lagged Tax 
Variable, and one period temporally lagged tax variable of the leader is included in each 
model. This gives us a total of sixteen models (eight jurisdictions and two different tax 
measures for each jurisdiction). In most of the models own tax rate (lagged) is still large 
and positive. The spatial lag variable is still positive although not always statistically 
significant. Thus the tax interaction is still present among the remaining seven countries 
in each model. 
     
28 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader 
Leader Country Considered BRN BRN HKG HKG IDN IDN MYS MYS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES EATR STR EATR STR EATR STR EATR STR 
         
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate 0.129 0.0367 0.357** 0.0363 0.332** -0.0171 0.459** 0.231 
 (0.202) (0.368) (0.119) (0.201) (0.100) (0.237) (0.174) (0.287) 
Leader’s Lagged Tax Rate 0.0664 0.116 -0.114 0.128 -0.157*** -0.0692 -0.205 0.00987 
 (0.145) (0.155) (0.0935) (0.196) (0.0367) (0.0591) (0.154) (0.232) 
Own Lagged Tax Rate 0.553*** 0.157 0.676*** 0.302* 0.782*** 0.429** 0.625*** 0.241 
 (0.0721) (0.129) (0.0882) (0.139) (0.105) (0.133) (0.139) (0.144) 
Dependency Ratio 0.0129 0.0870 -0.0109 0.0626 -0.129 -0.0228 0.116 0.190** 
 (0.0777) (0.0877) (0.0454) (0.0562) (0.148) (0.122) (0.0918) (0.0798) 
Population Density 0.00907 -0.166 0.0400 -0.00874 -0.0189 -0.0708 -0.0845 -0.163 
 (0.0533) (0.0958) (0.0651) (0.132) (0.0898) (0.0720) (0.0722) (0.103) 
Urban Population 0.0160 0.0155 0.0956** 0.131*** -0.0858 -0.0897 0.0339 0.0371 
 (0.0815) (0.0846) (0.0326) (0.0359) (0.101) (0.113) (0.0597) (0.0851) 
Government Expenditure 0.00142 -0.00526 -0.00366 -0.0176 -0.00764 0.00452 0.00165 0.00121 
 (0.0187) (0.0134) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0152) 
Openness 0.00596 -0.00985 -0.00388 -0.00299 -0.00908 -0.00879 0.00329 0.00869 
 (0.00892) (0.0127) (0.0162) (0.0200) (0.0115) (0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0161) 
Per Capita Real GDP -0.0917** -0.0607 -0.0172 -0.0278 -0.00217 -0.00907 0.00590 -0.0191 
 (0.0267) (0.0321) (0.0443) (0.0354) (0.0449) (0.0227) (0.0308) (0.0257) 
Rent from Natural Resources 9.11e-05 0.00127* 0.000211 0.00111** 0.000356 0.0011*** 0.00052** 0.0012*** 
 (0.000807) (0.000590) (0.000238) (0.000377) (0.000189) (0.00023) (0.000194) (0.000112) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
First Stage F Stats (11,7) 92.38 6.869 29.36 23.95 39.69 43.22 5.251 16.09 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0241 0.160 0.0261 0.0336 0.0134 0.0296 0.0189 0.0766 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.191 0.338 0.198 0.300 0.716 0.989 0.136 0.784 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader 
Leader Country Considered PHL PHL SGP SGP THA THA VNM VNM 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES EATR STR EATR STR EATR STR EATR STR 
         
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate 0.233 -0.112 0.404** 0.499*** 0.503** 0.333 0.250 0.230 
 (0.196) (0.350) (0.158) (0.135) (0.175) (0.247) (0.171) (0.309) 
Leader’s Lagged Tax Rate -0.00456 0.154** 0.223 0.0989 -0.0262  0.00976 -0.188** 
 (0.0843) (0.0618) (0.184) (0.156) (0.0468)  (0.121) (0.0664) 
Own Lagged Tax Rate 0.577*** 0.227* 0.463*** 0.118 0.475*** 0.212* 0.635*** 0.375** 
 (0.0819) (0.102) (0.109) (0.103) (0.0419) (0.106) (0.113) (0.128) 
Dependency Ratio 0.0573 0.0873 0.0336 0.0369 0.122 0.130 0.0398 0.0615 
 (0.0929) (0.0815) (0.0743) (0.0524) (0.107) (0.0882) (0.0795) (0.0745) 
Population Density -0.0248 -0.117 -0.0352 -0.220 0.0434 -0.121 0.0397 -0.0684 
 (0.0595) (0.0847) (0.0581) (0.132) (0.149) (0.152) (0.0623) (0.0675) 
Urban Population 0.0571 0.0296 -0.0405 -0.0298 0.0420 0.0321 0.0522 0.0418 
 (0.0578) (0.0635) (0.0581) (0.0783) (0.107) (0.0855) (0.0721) (0.0619) 
Government Expenditure 0.0279 0.0243** 0.0122 -0.00576 0.0114 0.00490 0.0194 -0.00191 
 (0.0154) (0.00954) (0.00823) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0155) 
Openness 0.0317** 0.0157 0.00730 -0.00781 -0.00551 -0.00430 0.0131 0.00328 
 (0.0107) (0.0190) (0.0102) (0.0184) (0.0165) (0.0190) (0.0115) (0.0119) 
Per Capita Real GDP -0.0379 -0.0472 0.00537 -0.0215 0.0203 -0.0162 0.00670 0.0149 
 (0.0338) (0.0286) (0.0465) (0.0462) (0.0371) (0.0292) (0.0452) (0.0195) 
Rent from Natural Resources 0.000525 0.0012** 0.000406 0.0011*** 0.000439 0.00108*** 0.000444 0.000836*** 
 (0.000373) (0.00021) (0.000271) (0.000269) (0.000322) (0.000242) (0.000238) (0.000217) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
First Stage F Stats (11,7) 22.90 14.37 12.58 5.325 53.33 65.04 102.2 9.029 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0389 0.0558 0.0182 0.0894 0.0249 0.0687 0.0239 0.0841 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.171 0.0700 0.152 0.700 0.188 0.879 0.467 0.846 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The estimated coefficient on the ‘leader’s’ rate is statistically significant only in 
case of Indonesia, Viet Nam and Philippines. However, the sign of the coefficient is 
negative for Indonesia and Viet Nam. The magnitude of the coefficient is small. For other 
countries the coefficients do not support any general conclusion.  Thus in our sample it 
appears that Indonesia and Viet Nam’s tax rate changes elicit opposite reaction from the 
other countries in the block. While for Philippines the reaction is in the same direction. 
These results imply that there is most likely no Stackelberg leader when it comes to the 
issue of setting corporate taxes – either STR or EATR. Given the general pattern of the 
movement of STR and EATR in this region (as shown earlier in Figures 1 and 2) this 
result does not surprise us. There was no obvious ‘leader’ in the setting of the taxes – 
either STR or EATR. Singapore and Hong Kong maintained the lowest rates, but others 
hardly followed suit. 
Countries in South East Asia vary widely in their level of development, availability 
of natural resources, size and national needs. As a result the economic policies in each 
country differ from the others in order to deal with country specific needs. On the one 
hand we have countries and administrative regions like Singapore and Hong Kong which 
do not have many natural resources and therefore use much lower tax rates than the other 
countries to attract capital (Rogers, 2002; Chia and Whalley, 1995). On the other, we 
have countries with natural resources with relatively higher tax rates compared to others. 
Singapore not only has a lower tax rate than others in our sample (except Hong Kong) but 
from 1950s it has also used other preferential policies to attract ‘Pioneering Industries’. 
For example Singapore offers a ten year tax holiday. The activities of Singapore and 
Hong Kong may not have exercised enough pressure on the neighboring countries to 
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lower their rates, but may have pressured them to follow suit in providing other types of 
incentives to attract capital. For example Philippines and Thailand provides eight years of 
tax holiday, Vietnam provides five years, while Indonesia provides two years (Suzuki, 
2013). At the same time Singapore and Vietnam, two countries which have reduced their 
corporate tax rates the most have also implemented or increased their indirect taxes – 
VAT and GST. Thus the countries which have lowered their taxes on capital have 
(following the prediction of the classic tax competition theory) increased the tax burden 
on the less mobile factors. Thus it may be wrong to say that there is no policy 
competition or interaction at all across this region because there is not much evidence to 
support the conclusion of explicit tax competition.  
At the same time we also note that the South East Asian countries attract capital 
as a whole. MNCs tend to establish their manufacturing partially in several of these 
countries. This is the reason of very high intra-industry trade among these countries 
compared to other countries (Kuroda, 2002). The establishment of ASEAN has increased 
the trade in finished good with the rest of the world while the trade among these countries 
remains predominantly governed by intermediate and semi-finished products (Sharma & 
Chua, 2000 and Cortinhas, 2007). Such intra-industry trade indicates strong 
agglomeration forces. In the presence of agglomeration forces the countries of South East 
Asia which have large domestic markets are not yet faced with the prospect where they 
must reduce taxes too drastically in response to each other’s policy to lure capital 
(Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). Rather it is quite plausible 
that countries in our sample are not competing among themselves to attract capital either 
from the rest of the world or from each other. These countries as a whole are attracting 
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capital from the rest of the world. Cheap labor and less stringent regulatory policies in 
many of these countries are working as the main capital magnets for the entire region.  
Our conjecture that these countries are not too strongly competing amongst 
themselves to lure capital away from each other gets further support when we recognize 
that in last few years the main policy thrust of these countries have been concluding 
Double Tax Avoidance Treaties and bolstering their transfer pricing related regulations. 
Double taxation results in capital flight from both countries (where the capital was being 
taxed) to a third country. To address double taxation countries can either provide 
unilateral relief under its own tax law, or through bilateral tax treaty. Countries in the 
South East Asian region have vigorously pursued the bilateral treaty path – both with 
countries with in the region and outside the region. By 2006, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Vietnam had the most extensive and modern bilateral treaty network in this region 
(Farrow & Sunita, 2006). As the following table (Table 5) shows other countries have 
also followed suit in recent years. 
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Table 2.6: Year of signing/coming into effect of Double Tax Avoidance Treaties 
 Brunei Hong 
Kong 
Indon-
esia 
Malay-
sia 
Philipp-
ines 
Singa-
pore 
Thail-
and 
Vietnam 
Brunei         
Hong 
Kong 
2011        
Indon-
esia 
2002 2013       
Malay-
sia 
2010 2013 1991      
Philipp-
ines 
  1993 1982     
Singa-
pore 
2005  1990 2004 1977    
Thail-and  2006 2004 1982 1982 1975   
Vietnam 2009 2010 1997 1995 2001 1994 1992  
Source: Ministry of Finance websites of the above countries. 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This paper tries to answer two questions about tax interaction in the sample of 
jurisdictions we studied. First, is there evidence of strategic tax interaction among these 
jurisdictions? Second, if there is evidence of interaction then is there any evidence of the 
existence of a Stackelberg leader within such tax interaction? 
To answer the first question we estimated the tax reaction function as a Spatially 
Lagged Dynamic models assuming a Nash setting. In both our specifications we find that 
there is some evidence that the jurisdictions behave in such a way that Effect Average 
Tax Rate seems to be strategic complements while Statutory Tax Rate is not. To answer 
the second question we estimated the models treating each country as the Stackelberg 
leader separately. Interestingly there is not much support of the existence of any 
Stackelberg leader in our sample. 
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These results have important and interesting policy implications. We have found 
that although there is some evidence that the jurisdictions interact strategically in terms of 
Effective Average Tax Rate but not in terms of Statutory Tax Rate. Moreover, the 
Effective Average Tax Rates have not declined but rather gone up in recent years. Some 
of the countries in our sample do provide strong incentives to capital through other 
measures like tax holidays and double tax avoidance treaties. In addition, these countries 
and regions are strengthening their transfer pricing regulatory mechanisms. At the same 
time there is the observed pattern of slowly but gradually declining tax rates most of the 
jurisdictions. This reduction in the statutory tax rates appears to be more a result of the 
ongoing tax reform policies than tax competition. The competition for capital most 
certainly happens in terms of incentives provided to capital in forms other than tax rates. 
Having cheap labor (relative to the rest of the world) and enjoying the benefits of 
agglomeration rents (as part of members of the region as a whole), most of these 
countries are not yet faced with the prospect of capital flight and hence not yet showing 
signs of aggressive tax competition. However, in future the possibility of such 
competition cannot be ruled out if other regions of the world start luring away the capital 
from these countries. More coordination and harmonization might be necessary as and 
when such scenarios come to fruition.   
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Chapter 3: Essay 2 – In Search of a Soft Budget Constraint in Indian 
State Finances 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Janos Kornai (1979, 1980, and 1986) introduced the idea of Soft budget constraint 
(SBC henceforth) in the context of the public sector enterprises in the centrally planned 
economies of that time. According to Kornai, when the organization or enterprise behave 
inefficiently and financially irresponsibly due to having the knowledge (or expectation) 
that a higher level government or authority (or the creditors) will bail it out in case of 
financial trouble resulting from its own financial mismanagement then we can say that 
the organization faces a Soft Budget Constraint. The existence of SBC distorts the 
incentive structure for subsidiary organizations to manage its finances prudently. The 
canonical model of SBC in the literature (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995) argues that the 
inability of politicians and policy makers to commit ex ante to a no-bailout policy is the 
main reason behind the existence and persistence of SBC. Following Kornai the early 
literature looked at the behavior of public sector enterprises and in some cases large 
private corporations (and banks) to study the nature and existence of SBC (Maskin, 
1999). McKinnon and Nechyba (1997) and then Quian and Roland (1998) first pointed 
out that even the fiscal behavior of lower levels of governments in a fiscal federation can 
be symptomatic of the existence of SBC. Subsequent literature has come to recognize that 
the existence of SBC can create sever problems for the fiscal viability of federations and 
more generally of decentralized systems, and in many federations SBC is endemic 
(Rodden, Eskelund and Litvack, 2003). 
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Wildasin (1997) noted that the sub-national governments (state and local) in 
advanced industrialized countries face economic hardship from time to time (for 
example, New York in the 1970s, Philadelphia and Pennsylvania in the 1990s, German 
Landers). The higher levels of government intervene in such situations and give rise to 
the expectations of SBC for other similar lower levels of governments. However, the 
extent of SBC in developed countries generally tend to be limited by the severity of the 
‘conditions’ of such bail out such as firing and furloughing of employees, forced 
spending cuts etc. which can be seen as punishments for the fiscal mismanagement of the 
lower governmental units. Developing and transitional countries on the other hand 
although have to rescue the lower level units with funds and resources, but they do not 
and cannot generally impose such strict punishment on the lower units. This type of 
behavior on part of the higher level government makes the budget constraint faced by the 
lower level units soft and nonbinding. More generally, the problem of SBC can be 
interpreted as another manifestation of the problem of the mismanaged commons 
(Rodden, Eskelund and Litvack, 2003). The transfers for bailouts from the central 
government are drawn from the common revenue pool while the overspending only 
benefits the constituents of the local/regional government getting the bailout. The local 
residents are benefiting at the cost of the other residents of the country and this is 
operationalized by the fiscally imprudent behavior of the local/regional government. 
The questions that have been dogging researchers in this area are generally 
threefold. Why and how do SBC exist? How to identify the existence of SBC in a 
particular country? How to solve the problem? The relative scarcity of empirical studies 
on Soft Budget Constraint reflects the difficulty of measuring this concept. SBC entails 
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the "expectations" of regional governments and their “behavior” resulting from that 
expectation. Most authors look at fiscal data of regional governments for signs of 
persistent mismatch between total regional revenue (including regular central transfers) 
and expenditures undertaken by them. There have been relatively few studies which try to 
uncover the existence of SBC through analyzing the interaction across sub-national 
governments11
3.2. Literature Review  
. It has long been alleged (see for example McCarten, 2003 for a summary)  
that Indian sub-national finances suffer from SBC. In this essay we have attempted to test 
the existence of this SBC in the state budgets of Indian Union.  
 
The creation of a federation is like a many party contract. It is a contract between 
the national and sub-national governments. It is also a contract between the citizens and 
different levels of governments. In the contract between the national and sub-national 
government the behavior and actions of the two governments resemble a sequential game 
(Wildasin, 1997; Inman, 2003; Goodspeed, 2002). By studying the first stage actions, 
announcements and policies of the central government, the regional government tries to 
assess credibility of a no bailout (for mismanaged subnational units) policy. Then the 
subnational government decides to spend either within means or overspend. If it 
overspends then the central government has to choose either to stick to its policy or to 
provide bailout. However, the existence of SBC in practice implies that the credibility of 
the no bailout policy suffers from the time inconsistency problem (Goodspeed, 2002). 
According to Wildasin (1997) the ultimate decision of providing or not providing bailouts 
                                            
11 An unpublished working paper by Petterson-Lindbom and Dahlberg (2003) is a notable 
exception. 
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to local governments depends on the extent of externalities created by the provision (or 
no provision) of the local public goods under the jurisdiction of the profligate sub-
national unit. In his model the central government’s objective is to maximize the welfare 
of all the citizens of the country (following the classical literature on public goods 
provision and fiscal federalism) through the provision of national public goods and also 
by ensuring some provision of local public goods. The local public goods provided by the 
local and regional governments not only benefit the local residents but there are some 
externalities spilling over to other jurisdictions as well. When a failing local government 
decides (or is completely unable) to limit the provision of this public good the residents 
of other local jurisdictions also suffer. So the central government has to decide whether to 
limit the provision of the national public good and subsidize the provision of the local 
public good that has been partially or fully discontinued by the local unit. If the cost to 
the citizens of a reduction in the national public good is mitigated by the positive 
externalities arising from the restoration of the supply of the local public good in the 
jurisdiction of the mismanaged local government, the central government decides to 
provide the bailout. Wildasin further asserts that this is more likely to be the case for 
larger sub-national units rather than smaller sub-national units. Thus larger sub-national 
governments are more likely to operate under the belief that the budget constraint is not a 
hard constraint. In effect what Wildasin is arguing is basically a variant of the “too big to 
(let it) fail” argument which we have heard for several banks and financial institutions 
during the recent recession. Practical experience however does not fully support 
Wildasin’s hypothesis. Not only large, but we have seen smaller jurisdictions too get 
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bailouts. Examples range from Germany, Argentina, and Colombia to Brazil (Hagen, 
2000). 
Goodspeed (2002) analyzed the problem of SBC in a political economy game 
theoretic model. His model differs from Wildasin’s model in three important ways. First 
in the framing of the objective function of the central government, in assuming away any 
externality from regional and local public goods, and finally by making the local 
governments Stackelberg Leaders12
                                            
12 In this formulation, higher level government does not announce any policy as a first stage 
action. Rather it is the local/sub-national governments which first decides whether to spend 
prudently or not. 
 in this two periods sequential game. For Goodspeed 
the objective of the central government is re-election and citizens’ votes depend on the 
supply “public goods” as a whole. Here the citizens have no way to distinguish between 
local or central public goods and so their unhappiness results in lower votes for the 
national government. In such a model it is shown that when people’s voting behaviors in 
favor of the incumbent central government is more responsive to the increases in the 
quantity of public goods at low utility levels (i.e. at low starting public goods levels), it is 
in the self-interest of the central government to grant bailouts to profligate local 
governments (in the second period) so that they do not reduce local public goods. Here 
the local government knows that central government’s no bailout policy is time 
inconsistent. The central government thus suffers from what has come to be known as the 
commitment problem - the central government cannot commit to a hard budget 
constraint. The local governments are aware of this problem and this leads to two 
consequences. First, the profligate regions borrow more under SBC in the first period 
than it would under Hard Budget Constraint as it knows less local public consumption 
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has to be earmarked for servicing the debt. Second, the local region’s tax burden 
increases only by a fraction of the borrowing as the rest is transferred to other parts of the 
nation (especially when bailouts are given to only the profligate region while taxes are 
raised across the nation). A corollary of this analysis is that regions where the incumbent 
government does not enjoy much support to start with will enjoy more bailouts than 
regions where they are already strong. But note that Robinson and Torvik (2009), 
however, reached theoretical results where bailouts are used by the incumbent 
government to “reward” their supporters more relative to the detractors. In their model 
the political party which constitutes the incumbent government at the center tries to 
consolidate its power and hold over those areas where it is already strong. Moreover, 
federal governments in developing countries are generally reluctant to ‘punish’ ordinary 
citizens many of whom are poor and depend crucially on the government services, for the 
fiscal mismanagement of the state and local governments – sometimes out of goodwill 
and ethical principles and sometimes to avert political suicide. 
 
The existence of SBC eventually leads the central governments to fund more of 
regional and local expenditures than it intended and it leads the regional and local 
governments to overspend. It is however useful to note at the outset that bailouts – large 
one time transfers from the center to the local or regional governments are not necessarily 
symptomatic of the existence of SBC. Such transfers may actually be for helping out a 
sub-national unit in genuine fiscal trouble where it landed due to macroeconomic 
conditions in general and for no faults of its own. On the other hand, instead of a onetime 
transfer the center may choose to infuse relatively smaller transfers over the entire fiscal 
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year or allow special purpose grants which are much difficult to identify than lump sum 
bailouts. SBC is a “belief” on part of the sub-national units. Resource transfers from the 
center which stands to fund overspendings of the sub-national units – whether in the form 
of lump sum grants or continuous infusion of funds – only strengthens this belief. As 
Rodden et al. (2003) correctly recognizes, there does not exist a simple identifier of SBC. 
Sometimes SBC is outwardly obvious from the constitutional mandates and court rulings 
(as in the case of Germany) and sometimes it is the intangible manifestation of 
expectations.  
There have been several studies on the determinants of expenditure and deficits in 
state finances in India (Chaudhuri and Dasgupta, 2006; Dutta, 1997; Khemani, 2002; 
Khemani, 2004, Keefer and Khemani, 2009, Dash and Raja, 2013). These studies 
consider economic or political variables as the factors influencing the pattern of 
expenditures and deficits. We have argued that SBC is more of a ‘belief’ on part of the 
state governments about getting fiscal bailouts. Such beliefs are built up on one’s own 
past experience and experience of others. Interestingly none of these studies look for any 
pattern of interaction across the states. In this paper we attempt to fill this void, and argue 
that the existence of SBC in Indian state finances can only be clearly deciphered if we 
account for these strategic interactions across states.  The next section explains the nature 
of state finances and how these interactions are likely to take place. The following section 
builds up the empirical model for investigating the existence of SBC in Indian state 
finances. 
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3.3. Issues of Fiscal Discipline in Indian State Finances 
India is a de facto federal country with a quasi-federal Constitution. Unlike the 
USA, the Constitution grants more power to the national government compared to the 
states. The consequence of the quasi-federal and quasi-unitary constitution is that most of 
the effective taxing powers are concentrated at the central government or Government of 
India (GOI) (Bahl, Heredia-Ortiz, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005a). Having a strong 
central government and a quasi-unitary constitution was imperative at the time of 
independence. But this has led to a situation where fiscal accountability of state 
governments has not been clearly defined. The GOI has constitutional powers to 
intervene in state affairs and issue directives to the state governments. Although the states 
incur a large share of social and economic expenditures they are constitutionally 
handicapped in the matter of tax sources. However, it is also true that the states have not 
yet shown enough willingness or ability to broaden the tax bases allocated to them in an 
efficient manner (ibid, p.1). 
The central government finances more than half of the state's financial 
requirements through central transfers or through debt financing. It is true that this 
generalization sweeps over tremendous disparity in performances of the States and over 
different periods (McCarten, 2003; Khemani, 2004). However, the composition of the 
state expenditure (wages, pensions and interest payments) hardly gives the states any 
maneuverability (Bahl et. al., 2005a) due to their contractually fixed nature. For the first 
four decades after independence India tried a modified planned economy model under the 
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exegesis of the extra-constitutional Central Planning Commission13. The policy tool used 
by the Planning Commission was the allocation of funds through the Plan transfers of 
which grants and loans had a 30:70 mix14
As noted earlier the disparity of tax sources between GOI and the state 
governments is entrenched in the Constitution of India. The central government enjoys 
relatively more buoyant sources of revenue and therefore within the federal system four 
channels have been devised to transfer funds from the center to the states
. At the same time specific transfers were 
channelized through the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) under the line ministries. 
GOI used the central funds (allocated through matching and conditional block grants) to 
influence the expenditure patterns of the States. For the most part, States were viewed not 
as semi-autonomous jurisdictions but rather agencies of the central government for the 
implementation of centrally designed development projects some of which encroached 
into areas reserved for the states alone by the Constitution. This bred a culture of 
overspending and low reliance on own resources by the States. In 1991 the economy of 
India was liberalized, the license raj system of central control was more or less abolished. 
With this liberalization, the central control over state finances was relaxed, at least on 
paper. 
15. These are the 
Finance Commission Transfers, Planning Commission Transfers (as noted earlier), 
Conditional Matching Grants and Loans from the center16
                                            
13 This has recently been scrapped and substituted by another extra constitutional body 
called the Niti Ayog (Policy Commission). However, right now rather than making five year 
plans the role of this policy making body is more advisory in nature. 
14 This is known as the Gadgil formula. 
15 Excellent detailed analysis of the inter-governmental transfer system in India can be found 
in Rao and Singh (2001a, 2001b). 
. Due to the political nature of 
16 The Finance Commission (FC) is a statutory/constitutional body convened to determine 
some of the center to state transfers. Each FC generally works for two years and submits its 
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some of these fund transfer channels the state governments may find themselves facing a 
soft budget constraint (SBC). McCarten (2003) has a detailed discussion of the 
institutional structure of Indian federal system which points towards an environment 
where SBC is highly likely to exist. Even Bahl et. al. (2005a) points in the same 
direction. Planning Commission grants are subject to negotiations between the individual 
states and the Planning Commission (which is an extra-constitutional political body the 
members of which are from both the central and state legislatures) on a bipartite platform. 
Others have already commented that the outcomes of these negotiations are always 
politically determined (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Baron and Ferejohn, 
1989). It is also found that states run by the same political party (or coalition) as the 
central government enjoys bigger Plan transfers compared to others (or can at least 
expect to receive such larger grants or loans)17
                                                                                                                                  
report to the central government (GoI). The transfers (FC transfers) for the next five years 
(called the Implementation Period for the just dissolved FC) is then determined by the 
recommendations of this report. Towards the end of this Implementation Period the next FC 
is convened. 
17 See for example Khemani (2002, 2003). 
 while the contrary is generally true for 
Finance Commission (FC) transfers which are generally based on formula devised by 
each FC. However, the FC transfers formula takes into account the current spending level 
of the states to determine and forecast future needs. It has been alleged that as a result of 
such emphasis on current spending in the FC formula States strategically overspend in 
the budget years just preceding the creation of a new Finance Commission to influence its 
own share in Finance Commission Transfers (Gurumurthi, 1996). As noted above, 
Planning Commission transfers (which are mixtures of grants and loans) are subject to 
political negotiations and this contributes towards softening the budget constraint facing 
the states. Bahl et al (2005a) argue that the loan-grant mix of the Planning Commission 
52 
 
transfers encourages states to incur debt financing of projects (to get the grant part of the 
transfer which is 30%). States run by the same party as the center will hold more power 
in these negotiations and hence will not be afraid to run up deficits (as noted earlier, 
Khemani, 2002 and 2003 have found evidence in this regard). Goodspeed (2002) argues 
that regional governments run by the opposition (or other regional parties) will enjoy 
more bailouts because the federal/national government wants to gather more support in 
regions where it is politically weak (opposition led states). 
The existence of SBC should manifest itself not only in but in several related facets 
of state finances. It is one of the strategic behaviors of the state governments. Along with 
the strategic behavior of states in Planning Commission negotiations and prior to Finance 
Commission’s establishment (once every five years), states also consider the behavior 
and experience of other states when deciding whether to be in deficit or not. As we noted 
earlier, this ‘learning’ from the behavior and experience of other states is a crucial 
identifying feature of SBC. However, taken out of the context of strategic behavior this 
‘learning’ can also be interpreted as an evidence of yardstick competition or policy 
diffusion. That is why it is very important to look at this ‘learning’ across states (as 
manifested in interaction across them) jointly with their other strategic behaviors.   
Therefore, in this essay I attempt to explore the reaction of the states to the formation of 
FCs, the political affinity with the government at the Center and each others’ deficits 
when the spatial interaction across states is accounted for. In particular I want to test the 
following hypotheses: 
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Research Hypothesis 1: The accumulation of deficit by a state is influenced by the 
accumulation of deficit of its ‘neighbor’ states. In other words, if a state sees its 
‘neighbors’ are accumulating debt then it also feels comfortable in incurring/increasing 
its deficits. 
Research Hypothesis 2: Since the year preceding the constitution of the Finance 
Commission is taken as the base year by the Finance Commission for its calculations, 
therefore, the states try to show their bad fiscal conditions by running up relatively more 
deficits in these years. The Null Hypothesis is that establishment of Finance Commission 
does not elicit any strategic response from the states. 
Hypothesis 3: Political affinity between the state and central governments (same 
party government at the center and the state) encourages the state to incur higher deficits 
(in expectation of Planning Commission and other Grants and Loans).  
 
3.4. Econometric Specification 
3.4.1. The Model 
Conceptually the issue of SBC can be modeled as a simultaneous equation model 
when there is explicit default by the state (or lower level authorities) and bailouts by 
higher level governments. One equation describes the behavior of the central government 
while the other describes that of the state governments. To identify the parameters we 
need instrumental variables which can be included in one of the models and excluded 
from the other. In this regard, Petterson-Lindbom and Dahlberg (2003) uses a modified 
version of this strategy in their attempt to link the state government's fiscal behavior to its 
expectation of being rescued from financial troubles.  
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However, explicit default by state governments and bailout by the central 
government has not happened till now for any of the states of India (although for sub-
state level authorities like State Electricity Boards, Cooperative Banks and Nationalized 
Commercial Banks default and bailouts have taken place). What we can observe in Indian 
State Finances is the persistence of deficits in the State Budgets.  It is important to note 
here SBC arises because the higher level government fails (either intentionally or due to 
political compulsions) to stick to a market discipline policy ex post. Therefore our 
primary argument is that if one state sees that its neighboring states18
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜌𝜌∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖……. (1) 
 are incurring 
deficits without being penalized in any way by the Central Government (without any 
reduction in central grants and loans and other transfers) then it also incurs deficits 
without much ado. This spatial interaction of the surplus or deficits is the outward 
manifestation of SBC in the state fiscal environment in India. The econometric models 
that we have used in this paper try to capture this spatial relationship across states. 
In particular, the state fiscal behavior is modeled as a spatial autoregressive 
equation, 
Where Bit is the observed measure of fiscal behavior (surplus or deficit) of state i in 
period t. The own lagged fiscal measures is included in the model to account for the 
persistence of fiscal policy. The ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  term is the spatially weighted surplus or 
deficit of the ‘neighboring’ states and Xi are a set of state characteristic variables. We 
have used both (separately) lagged and contemporaneous values of Bjt to calculate this 
term. Finally, fi and ht are individual fixed effect and a time trend, respectively. The 
                                            
18The concept of ‘neighbor’ is defined later. 
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individual effect captures the unobserved state characteristics that do not vary over time 
but affect the fiscal decisions of the state government. We would like to incorporate time 
fixed effects to control for variables that might have a common effect on the all the states 
in a given year, such as business cycle conditions. However, as noted by Devereux et al. 
(2008) in a spatial autoregressive model we cannot estimate the effect of time dummies 
separately from the effect of the spatially lagged variable. 
The most important aspect of the above model is that it incorporates the weighted 
average of neighbor's fiscal behavior as an explanatory variable. Once we have accounted 
for the time persistence of fiscal variables (through the inclusion of the 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 term) and 
the economic characteristics of the jurisdiction that might affect its fiscal policy, the 
inclusion of this spatially lagged variable in the model is to account for the effects that 
the behavior of the neighboring jurisdictions have on each individual jurisdiction. When 
states react to each other’s fiscal behavior regarding deficits or surpluses, then neighbors’ 
decisions are endogenous and correlated with the error term and we expect to estimate a 
nonzero 𝜌𝜌. As noted by Anselin (1988) this endogeneity means OLS yields a biased 
estimate of the spatial parameter ρ. In the extant literature using spatial econometrics 
there are two approaches for getting consistent estimates of ρ. The first is the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) based approach (Case, Rosen, & Hines, 1993; Besley & Case, 1995; 
and Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001). The second is a two stage least squares estimation 
using instrumental variables (Devereux et al. 2008; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). In 
this paper I am implementing the second method. As part of a single country (and hence 
being economies in the same region), states are bound to be subject to correlated shocks.. 
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The GMM IV approach gives consistent estimates in the presence of spatial error 
dependence (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). 
Even if we observe a high value of 𝜌𝜌 still this may not mean that there is SBC in 
the Indian state finances. Rather this state-state interaction might be a result of interaction 
of expenditure level – states might be under some form of ‘yardstick competition’ or 
policy diffusion to match the spending levels of comparable states (Case et al. 1993). To 
test for this possibility we are going to estimate models similar to (1) for the different 
major expenditure categories. Expenditure on general administration (including interest 
payments), education, and health constitute almost 70 to 80 percent of state government 
expenditures. Therefore it makes sense to use the expenditure on education and health as 
two such expenditure categories. Moreover, from the expenditure on general 
administration I have excluded the interest payment, and taken the rest (which signifies 
the general expenditure on administration) as the third category. Finally, from within the 
other 20-30 percent of the expenditure the two major categories, namely, expenditure on 
rural development and transport and communication are taken to test this competing 
hypothesis. Estimated positive values for the spatial lag variables in these models 
(expenditure as dependent variable) will tell us that the expenditure decisions on these 
items of each state are affected by its neighbors’ decision which ultimately results in an 
interaction at the aggregate deficit level (and resulting in higher deficit by mimicking the 
neighbors in the aggregate), rather than the interaction being a direct result of deficit 
mimicking behavior. This evidence would then support yardstick competition. However, 
if we find that there is not enough evidence for expenditure mimicking following the 
yardstick competition theory (or for that matter policy diffusion), but there is deficit 
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mimicking behavior at the aggregate level and along with that we have strategic behavior 
(on part of the states) with respect to Finance Commission and Planning Commission 
transfers, then we can interpret that evidence in support of the existence of SBC instead 
of yardstick competition. 
 
3.4.2. The Weight Matrix 
The cornerstone of our analysis is the idea that the fiscal behavior of any state is 
partly affected by the behavior of the neighboring states. We are attempting to capture 
this interdependence by incorporating the spatially lagged or spatially weighted measure 
of fiscal behavior into the equation. The structure of the weighting matrix is an 
assumption imposed on the nature of interaction and the definition of neighborhood. 
Therefore to test the robustness of the results to the specific assumption made must be 
checked using different weighting schemes. In its cross section form the weight matrix is 
an nxn matrix (where n=number of states). Since no state can be its own neighbor hence 
the diagonal elements are set to zero. The off-diagonal elements contain the weight given 
by state i to the fiscal behavior of state j. The rows are normalized to sum to unity. The 
off diagonal elements define who are considered as ‘neighbors’ and who are not. There 
are different weighting schemes used in the literature employing spatial econometric 
methods. These include equal weights, inverseeconomic distance weights, equal 
contiguity weights, and inverse of geographic distance weights (distant states do not 
matter as much as closer neighbors). 
In my analysis I have implemented four different weighting schemes.  
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a. Contiguity Weights: The next weight scheme is the usual and simple contiguity 
or shared border weights. In this weight matrix if two states share a border then they are 
defined as neighbors and the corresponding element in the weight matrix is set equal to 1. 
If two states do not share any border then the corresponding element in the weight matrix 
is set to zero. This matrix is created using a visual inspection of a political map of India 
as of 2000. The weight matrix is then row normalized. The reason for using a 2001 map 
instead of a current map is that in 2001 each of the three states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh 
and Uttar Pradesh were bifurcated into two states each. However, I have excluded these 
new three states from my sample due to data problems. I am imposing the assumption 
that states which have ceased to share borders due to these bifurcations post 2001, still 
maintain their ‘neighborliness’. 
b. Inverse Economic Distance Weights (Two different Weighting Schemes): It is 
however quite likely that although all the other states are considered, but states ‘close’ in 
some economic sense to the state whose behavior is under consideration is given higher 
weight than others. The next two weight matrices implement this idea. The first of these 
are based on per capita gross state domestic product (GSDP) and the second is on the 
poverty rate. In each of these weight matrices the off diagonal elements are defined as 1 �𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑖 �⁄ . In this expression z denotes the variable that is being considered. For the 
weights based on GSDP, this is the per capita GSDP, while for the poverty rate based 
based weight matrix this is the poverty ratio (head count ratio). The bar on top of z 
signifies that the value of the variable being considered for calculating the weights is the 
sample average. Finally each element of the matrix is divided by the row total to make 
the matrix row standardized.  
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c. Political Affiliation Weights: All the above four weight matrices are originally 
created as cross section matrices and then they are converted into panel format matrices 
using the assumption that the pattern of interdependence across states remained the same 
across the entire sample period. Moreover, in each of the above matrices either economic 
consideration or Geography is given prominence. However, for my last weighting 
scheme I have relaxed both of these two assumptions. When a state government decides 
about fiscal matters it is quite possible that the elected officials will look at states 
governed by their party colleagues or coalition partners for guidance. For constructing 
this last weight matrix I have considered the political party or coalition that governed 
each state during each of the years in my sample. If two states were governed by the same 
party or by two parties belonging to the same political coalition then the corresponding 
element in the weight matrix is set to equal to 1. The element remains zero otherwise. 
Finally, the elements of the matrix are row standardized. 
 
3.4.3. Data and Control Variables  
Our sample period covers the period 1987-200719
                                            
19 The global recession started in 2008 and therefore I am skeptical to extend the sample 
period beyond 2007. Otherwise, data is available up to 2011-2012. 
 and the sample of states consists 
of the non-special category states. Currently India has twenty nine states. Three of these 
states came into being in 2001 (Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh). Among the 
other twenty six states, the states from north eastern India (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, 
Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura) and Himachal Pradesh 
are categorized as ‘Special Category’ states. For the purposes of center to state transfer 
and grants these states enjoy special benefits and hence are generally excluded from 
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studies covering the non-special category states. The three new states (Jharkhand, 
Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh) are excluded from the sample as the data pertaining to 
them only starts from 2001. Finally, Jammu and Kashmir which enjoys both 
constitutional special status and fiscal special status (included in the ‘Special Category’ 
state list) is also excluded. For the period 1987-2004, the source of the fiscal data is the 
State Finance Accounts (audited) published by the Auditor General's (CAG) office every 
year. The fiscal data for 2005-2007 are collected from the Study of State Budgets 
published by the Reserve Bank of India. 
Most of the elements of the state characteristic matrix are straight forward. Larger 
states (with higher population) can be expected to have higher expenditure needs 
compared to smaller states due to the sheer size and diversity of the population. For some 
expenditure categories although the economies of scale might help the larger states to 
spend less in per capita terms, but geographic and demographic spread seem to negate 
much of such advantage.  As an indicator of the size of the states I include the relative 
population or share of the state population in the total population as a control variable. 
Richer states have larger revenue bases and hence can be expected to have lower deficits 
(or higher surplus) in the aggregate, but not necessarily in per capita terms. However, 
other the richer states in India (except Maharashtra) are in the middle sized section, and 
as a result we expect them to have lower deficits in per capita terms as well. Per capita 
Gross State Domestic Product at constant prices (GSDP) is taken as a measure of the 
wealth of the state. Wealthier states are expected to have more tax resources and lower 
deficit ratios. States with higher proportion of poor people have higher needs than other 
states and may be forced to incur deficits and to account for this factor I include the 
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Poverty Rates of the state as a control variable. Heller (2005) has introduced the concept 
of Fiscal Space. Jurisdictions with higher Fiscal Space have better maneuverability in 
fiscal matters. I operationalize Fiscal Space as the difference between the own tax and 
non-tax revenue (including share in central taxes) and compulsory expenditure 
obligations of the states (normalized by the former). The compulsory expenditure 
obligations of the Indian States are more or less included into the category of Non-Plan 
Revenue Expenditures20. Finally, I include two dummy variables to capture the political 
environment of state policy making. The importance of both of these dummy variables 
has already been discussed in a previous section. The first dummy variable Dit is one if 
the fiscal year is just preceding the constitution of a new Finance Commission, and zero 
otherwise. The second dummy variable Pit is equal to one if the same party or coalition 
of parties governed both a state and the center, and zero otherwise21
The two dummy variables D and P are constructed from information available 
publicly about the Finance Commissions and Governments of the different states over the 
sample period. The state GDP, population and poverty rate data are collected from 
. The state 
characteristic variables are all lagged by one period. I have estimated the same models 
using contemporaneous values of these variables without the estimated coefficients 
changing qualitatively (sign and statistical significance). 
                                            
20 Till last year Indian budgets were broken down into two categories – Plan Expenditure 
and Non-Plan Expenditure – both in the Revenue and Capital Account. Plan expenditure is 
the part of expenditure (mainly new investment) which is for projects under the current Five 
Year Plan. All expenditure for the routine functioning of government and for projects started 
in a previous Five Year Plan (whose five year period has already elapsed) are included in 
Non-Plan Expenditure. 
21 Khemani (2003) uses a stricter criterion for a similar dummy variable in her analysis. 
While I have allowed the variable to take value one if the state is governed by a party 
belonging to the coalition that governs the center, she only allows strict matching of party 
identities. 
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Central Statistical Office (CSO) website. The population and poverty rates are not 
available as annual data. The former is available as decadal data (for the Census Years, 
1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 etc.), while the latter is calculated from the Large Sample 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO) more or less once every five years. The missing population values are imputed 
using an exponential growth rate formula for each state. On the other hand the missing 
poverty rates are imputed using an arithmetic decay rate. 
 
3.5. Results and Discussion  
In our analysis, Gross Fiscal Balance (Deficit or Surplus) is taken as the indicator 
of state fiscal discipline. The Gross Fiscal surplus or deficit is defined as the revenue 
receipt plus recovery of loans minus the sum total of revenue expenditure22, total capital 
outlay and state loans to sub-state organizations23
                                            
22 Revenue Expenditure in India is a government expenditure classification which includes 
current expenditure of the government or Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
including interest payments. 
23 This definition is slightly different from the IMF definition where the loans to sub-state 
organizations are not included. 
. The other measure of surplus or deficit 
that we could use is the overall surplus or deficit defined as the total of the balances on 
the revenue and capital accounts. However in government official statistics sources the 
gross fiscal balance is presented as the measure of fiscal balance of the different levels of 
government. This is also the measure favored, and clearly and consistently defined by the 
Budget Documents, the RBI and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. 
Due to the emphasis put on this particular definition of gross fiscal balance within the 
Indian public finance policy circles we think it is proper to use it as the measure of 
63 
 
interest. For our sample period (1987-2007) none of the states exhibit gross fiscal surplus. 
The deficit to GDP ratio has consistently been above or close to three percent of GDP. In 
Table 2, I present the statewise summary (mean) of the variables used (except the 
dichotomous or dummy variables). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Statewise Averages of the Variables Used (1987-2007) 
States 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gross 
Deficit 
Fiscal 
Space 
Poverty 
Ratio 
Population 
Share 
GSDP per 
capita 
Andhra Pradesh -0.035 0.270 19.025 0.086 220.698 
Bihar -0.052 -10.287 47.064 0.090 77.925 
Gujarat -0.039 -0.075 20.652 0.056 288.606 
Haryana -0.026 3.431 16.104 0.023 330.645 
Karnataka -0.031 9.344 27.954 0.060 237.058 
Kerala -0.044 -12.511 19.857 0.037 270.704 
Maharashtra -0.031 -3.759 32.046 0.107 325.857 
Madhya Pradesh -0.038 2.513 39.801 0.066 155.012 
Odhisha -0.052 -13.563 48.180 0.042 161.473 
Punjab -0.050 -21.172 9.570 0.027 325.684 
Rajasthan -0.048 -15.138 23.704 0.061 178.028 
Tamil Nadu -0.028 -1.739 28.742 0.072 265.853 
Uttar Pradesh -0.049 -16.775 35.232 0.182 133.277 
West Bengal -0.046 -37.277 31.583 0.090 190.904 
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) is in Per Capita terms, and at 2004-05 constant prices. 
Gross Deficit is expressed as a percentage of GSDP (at Current Price) 
 
 
The estimated models are presented in Tables 2, to 6. The estimates in table 2 are 
from six models – two each for each of the weighting schemes (geographic contiguity, 
Inverse GSDP, Poverty ratio, and Political Similarity). Each model uses temporally 
lagged (one period) values of the control variables including the lagged dependent 
variable. The odd numbered models for each weighting scheme use temporally lagged 
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values of the spatially lagged (weighted average of the neighbors’ fiscal deficit variable) 
variable, while the even numbered ones use contemporaneous values of the same 
variable. In all the models, irrespective of weighting scheme or how the spatial lag 
variable is included, the temporally lagged dependent variable has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. We expected this from the beginning. This coefficient 
captures the strong time persistence of fiscal behavior. The coefficient on Finance 
Commission dummy is negative and statistically significant. The dependent variable is a 
deficit/surplus variable. Therefore, a negative coefficient means surplus declines or 
deficit increases. We have already noted that within our sample none of the states ever 
enjoyed a surplus. Therefore, this coefficient supports the claim of previous authors that 
the states incur higher deficit in the years preceding the establishment of a Finance 
Commission. As explained earlier this implies that states strategically attempt to show a 
poor fiscal condition to draw relatively more from the common pool of resources to be 
distributed by the FC. The coefficient of the political affinity with the center variable is 
always positive and contradicts our general expectation that states with similar 
party/coalition government as the center would be trying to incur more deficit (also 
contradicts the evidence found by Khemani (2000, 2003). However, the coefficient is 
never statistically significant. Although this coefficient is not statistically significant, but 
the sign of the coefficient seem to support the conclusions of Goodspeed (2002) that 
central government tries to win support in areas where it is weak, and hence in Planning 
Commission type negotiations states governed by opposition (or regional parties) hold 
the aces. For the first three types of weighting schemes, namely, contiguity weights, 
inverse GDP difference weight, and poverty weights, the coefficient on the spatially 
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lagged variable is positive and statistically significant if we enter it with one period lag. 
But the statistical significance goes away when we enter it into the model 
contemporaneously. For the political affinity weights the variable is never significant, 
although the sign remains as expected24
The coefficient on the spatial lag variable is the largest when we use the poverty 
weights with the inverse GSDP weights and contiguity weights coming second and third. 
This is indicative of the importance of the issue of poverty in the Indian political and 
economic context relative to average income level or geographic closeness. State policy 
makers are most concerned with states with similar poverty levels. Consideration of 
overall economic situation (as captured by per capita GSDP) and geographic nearness 
comes after that. It seems that state policy makers’ decisions regarding deficit and surplus 
are affected most by those states that have a poverty level close to their own state’s 
poverty level. They seem to strongly expect the central government to treat states with 
similar or close poverty levels similarly. Here, one could be tempted to interpret this 
coefficient not as an indicator of strategic interaction across states but rather as an 
indicator of ‘similarity’ of finances of states with similar poverty levels. However, the 
poverty ranking of states is not exactly mirrored by the per capita GSDP ranking and 
geographic closeness (in fact there are wide variation when we compare the three 
rankings). Yet, when we use those weights we still get evidence of slightly weaker but 
still quite strong strategic interaction among states. If it was only that the finances of 
similarly poor states are similar and there is no strategic interaction across state finances, 
. 
                                            
24 The political affinity weight matrix is a very sparse matrix and may not capture the 
political neighborliness really well. 
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then those two weighting systems should not give evidence of any interaction at all, at 
least not at the level and strength as our results show. 
From these results it appears that states consider the weighted average of 
neighbors’ (as defined in the different weighting schemes except for the political affinity 
weights) fiscal behavior/condition of past year to decide about their own course of action 
regarding gross fiscal balance. However, it does not appear that the behaviors are 
contemporaneously jointly decided as if in the states are playing a Nash game with each 
other. Thus we tentatively conclude that there is some gross fiscal balance mimicking 
going on among the states in our sample, that is, neighbors’ behavior matter. Above we 
have argued that this mimicking could not be a result of just some natural or organic 
similarity inherent in similar states. However, as we discussed earlier, this ‘aggregate’ 
level mimicking may be a result of expenditure category specific mimicking or yardstick 
competition or even some spillover effect. States might actually be looking at their 
neighbor’s (poverty level based or based on geographic or economic similarity) 
expenditures across different categories and then trying to follow. A related explanation 
may also be found in the idea of policy diffusion. If the general trend is spending more on 
(say) education then other states might start doing the same by ‘learning’. Such category 
specific similarity in expenditures may ultimately be aggregated into similar levels of 
fiscal surplus or deficit. However, at the outset we note one important point. Yardstick 
competition to be the alternate explanation to the evidence of strategic interaction in 
deficits that we found, we need to find evidence of expenditure mimicking in all if not all 
the expenditure categories (like Case et. al. 1993). It is not quite plausible that states 
would be affected by yardstick in one or two expenditure categories. On the other hand 
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spillover effect to be an acceptable counter explanation we need to find negative effects 
in those expenditure categories that actually spills over across border, especially most 
strongly while using the geographic contiguity weight. In addition for those expenditure 
categories that cannot have any spillover effect across states. Next we test these 
alternative possibilities. 
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Table 3.2: Effect of Neighbors’ Gross Fiscal Balance 
 Contiguity Weight Inverse GSDP Weight Poverty Weight Political Similarity Weight 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Spatial Lag (One Lag) 0.268***  0.277***  0.307***  0.0700  
 (3.454)  (3.802)  (6.458)  (1.343)  
Spatial Lag (Contemp.)  0.157  0.107  0.131  0.0614 
  (1.761)  (1.172)  (1.688)  (1.022) 
(own) Lagged Dep. Var 0.603*** 1.248*** 0.606*** 1.163*** 0.560*** 1.168*** 0.651*** 1.396*** 
 (6.066) (8.968) (6.385) (7.350) (6.347) (10.08) (8.011) (9.323) 
Fiscal Space  8.81e-05 -0.000173* 0.000107** -5.64e-05 0.000117** -8.82e-05 0.000138** -0.000215 
 (1.681) (-1.796) (2.356) (-0.516) (2.474) (-0.839) (2.912) (-1.704) 
Poverty -0.000471 0.00426*** -0.000227 0.00324** -0.00109 0.00310** -0.00153 0.00478** 
 (-0.364) (3.317) (-0.151) (2.620) (-0.828) (2.604) (-1.234) (2.628) 
Population Share -0.000625 -0.00402*** 0.000123 -0.00300** -1.04e-05 -0.00312** -9.07e-05 -0.00474** 
 (-0.285) (-3.701) (0.0507) (-2.443) (-0.00392) (-2.578) (-0.0475) (-2.847) 
Per Capita Real GSDP -0.00144 -0.00245** -0.00102 -0.00221** -0.000858 -0.00201* -0.00169 -0.00292** 
 (-1.099) (-2.598) (-0.668) (-2.314) (-0.478) (-2.035) (-1.126) (-2.649) 
Finance Commission  -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0104*** -0.0110*** -0.0103*** -0.0110*** -0.00961*** -0.0119*** 
Dummy (-6.073) (-4.409) (-6.447) (-4.646) (-6.305) (-5.068) (-5.738) (-4.878) 
Affinity with Center 0.000697 0.00106 0.00112 0.00111 0.00109 0.00109 0.00126 0.00145 
 (0.510) (0.765) (0.858) (0.866) (0.820) (0.830) (0.888) (0.928) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
         
Jurisdiction Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Effect         
         
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
Number of states 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
First Stage F-Stats (8,14) 4686 4569 1400 3375 1419 2964 19570 839.5 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0104 0.0264 0.00980 0.0249 0.00915 0.0201 0.00706 0.0214 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.488 0.521 0.457 0.561 0.487 0.526 0.640 0.482 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the Indian public accounting system the expenditures of each state are 
categorized into Economic Services, Social Services and Administrative Services. Social 
Services include expenditure on Health and Education, and Administrative Services 
include expenditure on General Government Services and Interest Payments on previous 
debts. Together, Health, Education and Administration constitute around 70 to 80 percent 
of state government expenditure for each state. After eliminating the interest payments 
from the administrative services expenditures, these three categories still cover the lion’s 
share of the total state government expenditures. Therefore, to test the interaction in 
expenditures these three categories (education, health, and administrative services 
excluding interest payments) seem to be the natural three choices. From within Economic 
Services, I include two other categories – rural development25
   
 and transport and 
communication (roads, bridges etc.). In total these give me five expenditure categories 
which cover around 65 to 80 percent of the total expenditure of the state governments. 
Tables 3 through 6 present these estimation results. Each of these four tables shows the 
results for each of the four weighting schemes. In table 2 we saw that when the spatially 
lagged variable is entered contemporaneously, the coefficient estimates are not 
statistically significant. Therefore in the models of tables 3 to 6 we are only estimating 
models with the spatial lag variable entering with one period lag. From the perspective of 
yardstick competition, if it was present, we should find it most strongly in Health, 
Education, Rural Development and Transport. These are the categories where one state 
might want to follow the lead of others – especially its neighbors.  
                                            
25 Urban development expenditure, inexplicably, is categorized under Social Services and is 
not a very large share of state government expenditure. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Geographic Distance Weight) 
 Rural Development  Transport & 
Communication 
Education Health Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 9A Model 9B Model 9C Model 9D Model 9E 
      
Spatial Lag (with one period lag) -0.0805 -0.00141 0.0357 0.0244 -0.178 
 (-1.017) (-0.0195) (0.789) (0.385) (-1.275) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.624*** 0.781*** 0.827*** 0.818*** 0.748*** 
 (7.986) (12.15) (38.27) (24.59) (12.02) 
Fiscal Space 3.77e-06 7.72e-06** 3.51e-06 -1.47e-06 -7.50e-05 
 (0.650) (2.226) (0.329) (-0.552) (-1.675) 
Poverty 0.00235*** -5.59e-05 0.00196 0.000416 0.00250 
 (5.544) (-0.604) (1.727) (1.664) (1.751) 
Population Share -0.000228 -0.000529** -0.000653 -0.000115 -0.00306 
 (-0.437) (-2.395) (-0.876) (-0.548) (-1.443) 
Per Capita Real GSDP -0.000955 -5.32e-05 -0.000720 -2.86e-05 -0.000445 
 (-1.698) (-0.359) (-0.863) (-0.171) (-0.264) 
Finance Commission Dummy 0.000562* -0.000146 0.000462 0.000314*** 0.000120 
 (2.072) (-1.241) (1.101) (3.596) (0.127) 
Affinity with Center 0.000105 -0.000116 -0.000284 -0.000236 -0.000721 
 (0.443) (-1.401) (-0.629) (-1.591) (-1.429) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Jurisdiction Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 
Number of state1 14 14 14 14 14 
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14) 191 1932 13651 17203 2874 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0148 0.00355 0.0841 0.0338 0.0550 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.121 0.183 0.285 0.0723 0.104 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse GSDP Distance Weight) 
 Rural 
Development  
Transport & 
Communication 
Education Health Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 10A Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D Model 10E 
      
Spatial Lag (with one period lag) -0.107 0.0591 0.152* 0.0952 -0.207*** 
 (-1.083) (1.269) (1.936) (1.130) (-3.388) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.638*** 0.777*** 0.807*** 0.798*** 0.765*** 
 (7.737) (11.31) (31.96) (26.95) (12.68) 
Fiscal Space 3.83e-06 7.49e-06* 8.07e-06 -1.73e-06 -5.28e-05 
 (0.638) (2.065) (0.812) (-0.686) (-1.667) 
Poverty 0.00240*** 1.61e-05 0.00135 0.000311 0.00190 
 (5.008) (0.121) (1.290) (1.102) (1.288) 
Population Share -0.000231 -0.000534** -0.000901 -0.000154 -0.00278 
 (-0.365) (-2.219) (-1.198) (-0.805) (-1.494) 
Per Capita Real GSDP -0.00101 -0.000194 -0.00113 -8.66e-05 0.000252 
 (-1.718) (-1.285) (-1.183) (-0.549) (0.162) 
Finance Commission Dummy 0.000546* -0.000162 0.000487 0.000324*** -6.59e-05 
 (2.054) (-1.540) (1.177) (3.729) (-0.0644) 
Affinity with Center 9.67e-05 -0.000111 -0.000220 -0.000242 -0.000767 
 (0.393) (-1.425) (-0.489) (-1.654) (-1.302) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 
Number of state1 14 14 14 14 14 
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14) 220.4 2030 20346 9831 1289 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0145 0.00411 0.0906 0.0367 0.0480 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.129 0.183 0.305 0.0755 0.0881 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Poverty Distance Weight) 
 Rural 
Development  
Transport & 
Communication 
Education Health Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 11A Model 11B Model 11C Model 11D Model 11E 
      
Spatial Lag (with one period lag) -0.145 0.0791 0.0569 0.0822 0.0311 
 (-1.182) (0.764) (0.733) (1.377) (0.152) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.641*** 0.780*** 0.832*** 0.826*** 0.740*** 
 (7.548) (11.35) (37.65) (26.45) (9.679) 
Fiscal Space 4.63e-06 7.08e-06* 5.80e-06 -1.14e-06 -4.70e-05 
 (0.654) (1.781) (0.603) (-0.712) (-1.046) 
Poverty 0.00236*** -6.75e-05 0.00170 0.000294 0.00174 
 (4.716) (-0.835) (1.263) (1.107) (0.871) 
Population Share -0.000595 -0.000472* -0.000344 -3.50e-05 -0.00272 
 (-1.030) (-1.812) (-0.346) (-0.149) (-1.006) 
Per Capita Real GSDP -0.00110** -9.77e-05 -0.000565 -4.78e-05 -0.000974 
 (-2.224) (-0.765) (-0.619) (-0.331) (-0.571) 
Finance Commission Dummy 0.000574** -0.000168 0.000465 0.000324*** 0.000391 
 (2.148) (-1.486) (1.105) (3.710) (0.391) 
Affinity with Center 0.000137 -0.000113 -0.000292 -0.000244 -0.000732 
 (0.577) (-1.516) (-0.676) (-1.679) (-1.443) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 
Number of state1 14 14 14 14 14 
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14) 281.6 1191 18815 44361 1297 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0151 0.00396 0.0904 0.0355 0.0556 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.113 0.182 0.309 0.0771 0.0984 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Political Distance Weight) 
 Rural 
Development  
Transport & 
Communication 
Education Health Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 12A Model 12B Model 12C Model 12D Model 12E 
      
Spatial Lag (with one period lag) -0.0258 -0.0275 0.0201** 0.0412*** 0.0103 
 (-1.092) (-0.741) (2.197) (3.567) (0.409) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.625*** 0.775*** 0.825*** 0.819*** 0.737*** 
 (8.092) (11.93) (37.08) (23.05) (10.86) 
Fiscal Space 5.10e-06 7.55e-06** -1.00e-06 -2.97e-06 -5.26e-05 
 (0.801) (2.343) (-0.141) (-1.606) (-1.649) 
Poverty 0.00215*** -3.96e-05 0.00204* 0.000392* 0.00196 
 (3.919) (-0.478) (2.057) (1.972) (1.291) 
Population Share -0.000313 -0.000548** -0.000585 -9.77e-05 -0.00295 
 (-0.592) (-2.336) (-0.779) (-0.484) (-1.580) 
Per Capita Real GSDP -0.00101* -4.17e-05 -0.000608 -3.37e-05 -0.00111 
 (-1.863) (-0.371) (-0.663) (-0.200) (-0.660) 
Finance Commission Dummy 0.000536* -0.000131 0.000496 0.000338*** 0.000388 
 (2.019) (-1.237) (1.229) (4.368) (0.447) 
Affinity with Center 0.000137 -9.87e-05 -0.000265 -0.000231 -0.000740 
 (0.600) (-1.348) (-0.599) (-1.583) (-1.438) 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 
Number of state 14 14 14 14 14 
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14) 226.3 1937 11537 4775 1347 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0137 0.00407 0.0877 0.0328 0.0609 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.106 0.190 0.283 0.0717 0.106 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results from tables 3 to 6 tell us that there is no obvious pattern of strategic 
interaction in expenditure categories to support yardstick competition. Except for health 
and education under political affinity weighting scheme none of the other spatial lag 
coefficients are statistically significant or even large enough to attract our attention. On 
the other hand, the lagged dependent variable is always significant and has quite large 
coefficient as well. We found similar result in table 2 as well. This again indicates the 
strong time persistence of fiscal policy. The most important factor influencing a state’s 
expenditure in any category is thus its past expenditure in the same category. Rural 
development has a negative sign. This is unexpected by yardstick competition. We have 
already found that at the aggregate level deficit of one state begets deficit of another. To 
bolster yardstick competition as the counter explanation of this observed fact we need the 
sign of spatial lag variables to be positive which would imply more expenditure in a 
category by neighboring states begets more expenditure in the home state. However, the 
evidence points to the existence of some spillover effect in rural development 
expenditure. Rural laborers are most likely to travel to the geographically neighboring 
states and thus create this spillover effect. However spillover effect reduces expenditure 
and hence helps to better the deficit scenario. Thus aggregating spillover effect we cannot 
get a counter explanation to the existence of SBC. Transport has both positive and 
negative coefficients across different weighting schemes. Only the expenditures on 
education and health are always positive. That means there might be some evidence that 
states are influenced to mimic the expenditure pattern of neighbors (as defined by 
different weighting schemes) in education and health. Following Case et al (1993) one 
can take this to indicate that for these two categories the states seem to behave as if there 
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is some yardstick competition going on. However, both the coefficients are only 
statistically significant when we use political affinity weight. We have already seen that 
due to the sparse nature of the political affinity weight matrix this is not a very good 
weighting scheme. Moreover, as we already noted if yardstick competition is present then 
that should manifest in other categories as well, and not just two. Coming to the Finance 
Commission dummy and Affinity with Central government dummy variables, we again 
find no clear pattern.  Therefore, when we analyze individual expenditure categories, we 
do not find any clear and unequivocal counter explanation in the theory of yardstick. 
There is some weak evidence of yardstick competition in health and educational 
expenditure only but nothing as conclusive as the evidence in support of SBC at the 
aggregate level.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this paper we started out to search for empirical evidence of soft budget 
constraint in Indian state finances. Towards that end we modeled the fiscal deficits or 
surpluses of states as functions of the fiscal deficits or surpluses of ‘neighboring’ states 
using a spatially and temporally lagged dynamic model. We defined neighborhood using 
geographic, economic and political factors. We hypothesized that if the states are found 
to positively (negatively) respond to the surpluses (deficits) of neighboring states – that is 
if the coefficient is positive after other factors that are likely to affect the surplus or 
deficit are accounted for – then we can conclude that strategic interaction is present in 
Indian state finance. Moreover, we also postulated that if such interaction is not resulting 
from some underlying pattern of interaction in major expenditure categories, then that 
would be symptomatic of the existence of soft budget constraint. Towards this second 
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goal we modeled the expenditure in major expenditure categories using similar models as 
those for the deficits/surpluses.  
Throughout our sample period none of the states enjoyed a positive Gross Fiscal 
balance. Thus the positive coefficient on the spatial lag variable in the deficit/surplus 
equations mean that an increase in Gross Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP) by neighbors 
induces a state to increase its own Gross Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP). There is also 
evidence to support that states use deficits strategically to get more from the Fiscal 
Commissions. Moreover, our models for the expenditure categories failed to offer any 
clear pattern or even any consistently statistically significant pattern of interaction in the 
major expenditure categories. In India, explicit bailouts by the central government 
(Government of India) have not happened till date. Thus we can only indirectly observe 
the states’ expectations of ‘implicit bailout’ by the effect of other states’ deficit behavior 
on its own. In this interpretation the positive coefficient on the spatially lagged variable 
tells us that states do not expect to be ‘punished’ in any way for incurring deficits when 
their ‘neighbors’ also incur deficits. They expect their budget constraint to be soft and the 
central government to come to their rescue using grants and transfers. Therefore, the 
above results give evidence towards the existence of a soft budget constraint situation in 
the state finances of India. 
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Chapter 4: Essay 3 – Testing the Theory of Budgetary Punctuation 
Using Indian State Budget Data 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Budget, as one of the relatively more obvious instruments and indicators of policy 
focus of governments and the external manifestation of the choices among alternative 
usages of scarce resources, can be expected to exhibit the same pattern of dynamics and 
change as most other policy instruments. Incrementalism, which was developed by Davis 
and colleagues during the 1960s and early 1970s, was the dominant explanation of the 
public budgeting process for a considerable time period over the last century (Davis et al., 
1966a and 1966b; Davis, 1974). This theory of incrementalism tells us that the budget of 
a year can be expected to be different from the previous year only by a small percentage 
with exceptional changes being rare phenomena. However, this theory of budgetary 
policy change came under serious scrutiny from almost the very beginning (Wanat, 1974; 
Bailey and O’Connor, 1975; Dempster and Wildavsky, 1979; Berry 1990). Several 
studies have found that budget data are characterized by a substantial number of dramatic 
changes over previous years which cannot be explained by the incremental theory of 
policy change (Natchez and Bupp, 1973; Danziger, 1978; Boyne et al. 2000). In 1993 
Baumgartner and Jones introduced the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium, initially 
developed in the field of Paleontology and Evolutionary Biology, to the study of policy 
dynamics. The theory of Punctuated Equilibrium was offered as an extension, 
improvement and replacement of the incrementalist theory. 
Based on the concept of disproportionate information processing theory, bounded 
rationality and agenda based policy making, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
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describes policy processes as characterized by long periods of stability interrupted by 
rapid and large changes. Bounded rationality of policy makers, oversupply of 
information, and institutional frictions (Mortensen, 2005) are claimed to result in both 
stability and punctuation in policy making. Researchers have applied this theory to study 
budgetary changes along with other policy areas in several countries. 
Till now, this theory has been applied and tested in quite a few western industrial 
democracies with developed democratic political and policy making systems – both at 
national and sub-national levels. Within these studies there is a preponderance of USA 
based studies (Jones, Baumgartner, and True, 1998; Jordan, 2003; Robinson, 2004; 
Breunig and Koski; 2006; Ryu, 2009). The other countries that have been analyzed are 
UK (Breunig, 2006; John and Margetts, 2003), Denmark (Mortensen, 2005), France 
(Baumgartner, Foucault and Francois, 2006) and Germany. In these studies the authors 
have generally found the budgeting processes to follow the predictions of the Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory. However, there has been no attempt yet to test the applicability of 
this theory of budgetary policy dynamics in the context of developing or transition 
countries. 
In this paper we extend this literature by testing the applicability of Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory to analyze the budget data of Indian states. We attempt to understand 
whether the pattern predicted by this theory and observed in the context of the developed 
industrialized countries above is also present in the behavior of budgets in a developing 
country like India. On the one hand the political process in the states within the federal 
system of India are much more central government dominated (through grants – both 
conditional and unconditional, loans and insufficient revenue decentralization to the 
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subnational levels) compared to the USA, while on the other hand, the process is more 
federal in nature compared to the UK system from which it originated. The state policy 
making process is also substantially different from the countries that has already been 
studied – with political agenda being mainly dominated and directed by the political 
parties, higher levels of illiteracy, lower political awareness among the electorate, lower 
effects of grassroots politics and public opinion in the policy making process, and a 
multiparty system which many times results in coalition governments. Whether such 
differences affect the dynamics of policy is an important and interesting question that we 
try to answer in this paper. Jones et al. (2009) have termed Punctuated Budgets as the 
‘general law of budgeting’. However, in the context of India just observing stasis and 
jumps in budgetary data may not be enough to support this ‘general law’. It has already 
been commented that budgetary marksmanship in India suffers from forecast error 
(Chakraborty and Sinha, 2008). Thus the observed pattern of stability and punctuations 
may simply be due to error correction by the Finance Department from last year’s 
estimates (difference between last year’s budget estimates and revised estimates) or last 
to last year’s estimates (difference between last to last year’s budget estimates and 
actuals)26
                                            
26 The fiscal year in Indian states runs from April to March. The budget is generally presented in Indian 
state legislatures by the Minister of Finance of the state government during end of February to middle of 
March. The preparation of the budget by collecting the Demand for Grants from each Ministry or 
Departments starts around September of the previous year and continues till February. At the time of 
preparation of the Budget of any fiscal year, the Revised Estimate figures of the previous fiscal year and the 
Actuals/Accounts figures of the year prior to the previous fiscal year are available for consideration. 
. To be able to conclusively accept the applicability of Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory, in this paper we also test the alternative explanation of forecast error correction. 
The rest of this paper is organized in four more sections. Section II discusses the 
theoretical background of the paper and the hypotheses. In section III, we elaborate on 
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the data and method of my analysis; section IV discusses the results. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
Decision making at the government level is characterized by disproportionate 
information processing (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Disproportionate Information 
Processing (DIP henceforth) is the general formulation of the punctuated equilibrium 
model. The basic assumptions of both the incrementalist theory and DIP are the same. 
Both assume bounded rationality and serial information processing among policy makers 
and institutional friction in the processing capacity of political organizations (True, 1999, 
p. 97). However, for incrementalism these factors result in stasis and stability, while 
dramatic changes are relegated to the status of outliers. On the other hand, for DIP the 
same basic factors give a scenario of stability interrupted with punctuations which are not 
outliers but part of the system itself (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Therefore, 
incrementalism can be seen as a special case of DIP which focuses on periods of stability 
alone. 
Policy making process is divided into a general macro-political level and 
specialized subsystems (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The subsystems are characterized 
by stasis in policy making and dampening of external shocks, while the macro-political 
theatre is characterized by conflicts, heightened attention and positive feedback processes 
which exacerbate and amplify shocks (Mortensen, 2005). Some policy issues regularly 
hit the macro-political agenda without being redefined and without the mobilization of 
new political actors. Some policy issues hit the macro-political agenda and disappear 
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again without causing sustained and institutionalized changes in the policy. Finally some 
policy issues never appear on the macro political agenda. The same serial decision 
processing that ensure stability in normal periods also ensure increased focus on new 
issues to the exclusion of others once the issue reaches the macropolitical stage (John and 
Margetts, 2003). 
The preceding discussion leads to the first hypothesis that I want to test using the 
dataset of Indian state budgets. 
Hypothesis 1: Indian state budgets are punctuated and follow the ‘general law of 
budgets’ as espoused by Jones and colleagues. 
According to Jones and Baumgartner (2005) the level of institutional friction, 
information oversupply, availability of efficient information, interest mobilization 
through interest groups and interest configurations are different across different 
institutions and government organization. Thus the distributions of budgets changes 
should be different depending on the spending category we are looking at (Ryu, 2009). 
There are some spending categories where the beneficiaries are comparatively more 
organized into different visible and politically important interest groups. In the Indian 
context these are generally the employee and labor unions and employee coordination 
committees (of mid to low level government employees both within the bureaucratic 
mechanism and within the Public Sector Undertaking) which are affiliated to different 
political parties. Since the beneficiaries of these spending categories are relatively more 
organized, changes (especially downward) elicit much stronger and intense interest 
mobilization. On the other hand there are spending categories where even though the 
number of beneficiaries may be large but still they are neither organized nor politically 
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visible. Thus these two types of spending categories should exhibit different levels of 
punctuation. This leads to the following two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of punctuations in India’s State Budgets varies across 
spending categories. 
Hypothesis 3: Spending categories where the beneficiaries are more organized and 
visible suffer less from budgetary punctuations. 
Finally, it is an important question to consider whether punctuated equilibrium 
theory is a valid explanation to the budgetary punctuation which we may observe in the 
data. There may be two objections in this regard. The first objection is whether it is 
appropriate to use subnational data for a country like India to test a theory like punctuated 
equilibrium. At least till 1991, Indian state finances were dominated by national planning 
objectives coming down from the central governments.27
                                            
27 In 1991 India faced a macroeconomic problem in the form of low forex reserves and declining value of 
Indian currency. Indian central government had to take external loans and liberalize the economy partly as 
condition of those loans. 
 Thus the remnants of such a 
centrally driven system may still be in place reducing the policy autonomy of the states. 
However, we contend that the liberalization policy pursued post-1991 has reduced the 
importance of the centrally planned economic system in India and has created an 
environment where the policy autonomy of the states has been introduced. Moreover, this 
is also the same period when coalition governments became the rule at the central level 
and resulted in weaker central governments vis-à-vis the states. The second objection is 
that the observed budgetary punctuations may simply be corrections of forecast errors 
made by finance departments in previous year’s budget. When the revised estimates (or 
accounts/actuals) for a year diverges too much (by percentage) from what had been 
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budgeted earlier, we say that there was a large forecast error in the budgeted amount. 
This divergence may be a result of changing economic conditions which makes prior 
budget calculations invalid or may be results of political exigencies during the execution 
of the budget. If the budgetary punctuations are simply results of forecast errors 
committed earlier, then we get an explanation for the punctuations that compete with the 
punctuated equilibrium theory. This leads to the final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The observed punctuated pattern of budgetary change can be 
attributed to forecasting error of the finance departments. 
In the next section we elaborate on the data and method I have used to test these 
hypotheses. 
4.3. Data and Methods  
To study the extent of incrementalist vis-a-vis punctuated aspects of the budgets we 
have constructed a new dataset of Budget Estimates and Revised Estimates of revenue 
expenditures on twelve major categories of state functions across eighteen non-special 
category states. These are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattishgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odhisha, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal. Indian budgets 
used to make a distinction between planned and non-planned expenditure till 2013. The 
budgeted expenditure on any new project is kept under the "plan" portion of the budget if 
the project was started within the current five year plan28
                                            
28 It was not necessary that the project was a new project or scheme that started under the proposed budget 
of the current year. 
. Projects that started in a 
previous five year plan, but still continuing is entered into the "non-plan" section. Any 
89 
 
government expenditure not started as part of the five year plans goes straight to the non-
plan section from the beginning. This is an artificial distinction between expenditures 
(unlike the distinction between revenue and capital expenditures) and recently the 
Government of India has proposed scrapping this system of accounting (along with the 
dilution of the entire system of five year plans). We, therefore, use the total budgeted 
revenue expenditure figures (plan plus non-plan) instead of considering this distinction. 
The twelve categories of expenditure considered are – education, health, water supply, 
urban development, rural development, labor related expenditures, social security, 
irrigation, roads and bridges, administration and police. These twelve categories are the 
major expenditure categories devolved to the states under the federal system of the Indian 
Constitution. The dataset covers the period from 2000 to 2013. The source of the data is 
Reserve Bank of India's29
Time series data generally tends to exhibit nonstationarity and autoregression. Thus 
instead of analyzing the annual figures of Budget Estimates, we examine the annual 
percentage change of Budget Estimates. Thus, for each time period t, for the ith category 
of expenditure we compute (Xit–Xit-1)/Xit-1 and multiply it by 100 to express these as 
percentages. This percentage-count measure is the usual measure constructed by other 
studies of budgetary punctuation (for example Jones, Sulkin and Larsen 2003)
 yearly Study of State Finances. The nominal figures are 
adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index (base year 2000) figures available from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. 
30
                                            
29The central bank of India. 
. These 
annual change scores are pooled by state and then by categories (separately) to give the 
30 The other measure that could be constructed is the percentage-percentage measure. This measures is 
defined as the percentage change in relative importance of the ith category from time t-1 to t, or 
�
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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datasets that we use for the analysis. Three states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya 
Pradesh) were split in 2000-01 and thus three extra states were created from them 
(namely, Jharkhand, Uttaranchal/Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh). The 2001-02 figures 
for these states therefore show abnormal annual changes which are clearly not due to 
budgetary punctuation. Therefore we dropped these years for these states from the 
analysis. For all other states the change scores start from 2001. 
The methods we use for the analysis are threefold. First we "eyeball" the 
distributions using the histograms for each category (pooled across all states by years) 
and for states (pooled across all categories by years) along with a normal distribution 
probability density function curve of the same mean and same variance. Distributions of 
variables that show punctuation are characterized by high peaks (overrepresentation of 
small changes), weak shoulder (underrepresentation of midrange changes) and fat tails 
(some massive changes) (see for example Breunig et. al. 2009) compared to normal 
distributions. In other words these distributions exhibit leptokurtic nature. The choice of 
bins (groupings of percentage changes) and hence smoothing is an important 
consideration while constructing histograms. Several methods are available from the 
statistics literature to construct optimal bin width and hence bin numbers (Izenman, 
1991). Some of these methods implicitly assume a Gaussian distribution of the 
underlying data generating process and hence are not appropriate for my analysis. We use 
the Freedman-Diaconis rule of optimal bin width, h = 2*IQR*N(-1/3). IQR in this formula 
is the interquartile range of the data (75th percentile minus the 25th percentile) and N is 
the sample size. 
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The second method involves directly testing for normality. Within this second 
method, there are again two choices available - visual and statistical testing. The visual 
method involves creating Q-Q plots for the data series. If the observed data deviates from 
the diagonal line too much then we can suspect a violation of normality. The testing 
methods involve using explicit tests of normality like Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-
Wilk, Lilliefors or Anderson-Darling test (Razali and Wah, 2011). We use both methods 
as using only the tests are not recommended (D'Agostino, Belanger, and D'Agostino, 
1990). The extant literature uses both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests 
(Breunig and Koski, 2006; Mortensen, 2005). The null hypothesis in both tests is that the 
data follows normal distribution. But the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is considered to have 
lower power than the Shapiro-Wilk test, especially when leptokurtosis is involved which 
is the scenario with my data. Thus the statistics literature prefers the latter over the former 
when the mean and variance are not known. The null hypothesis in the Shapiro-Wilk test 
is that the data generating process is normal. If the null is true, the W statistic is equal to 
one, while if W is significantly smaller than one, then we can reject the null of normality. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test is also augmented with the Shapiro-Francia W' test.  
For an initial inspection we pool the data for all the states and all categories in the 
sample and create combined series of annual changes. This gives me 2732 observations 
in total (after deleting missing values). Figure 4.1 shows the histogram of distribution 
created for this combined series. The rug on top of this histogram shows the frequency of 
each change score. The three figures, Fig 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 shows the distribution of the 
percentage-count change scores for each of the states in my sample. The next set of 
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figures, Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 shows the distribution of the dependent variable for each of the 
twelve spending categories. 
Next, we construct the Q-Normal plots for visually inspecting the deviation of the 
annual percentage changes of budgeted expenditures in state (all categories combined) 
and in each category (All states combined) separately. Given that our sample is 
chronologically not very long we refrain from constructing the plots for each category for 
each state separately. These figures are presented in the Appendix B as figures B.1 to 
B.5. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 contain the descriptive statistics and the results of the formal 
tests of normality. For non-Gaussian distribution mean and variance is not very 
meaningful measures of descriptive statistics. Therefore, following the suggestions from 
the applied statistics literature and the standard practices in the punctuated equilibrium 
literature compute the Median, Interquartile Range, Kurtosis and L-Kurtosis. Standard 
Kurtosis measures are overly affected by large outliers. Our data is characterized by large 
outliers, hence we need some better measure of Kurtosis than the standard one. 
Fortunately, such measures (robust of the presence of outliers) are available in the form 
of L-Kurtosis measure (Hosking, 1990) and we present those numbers computed from the 
data. The columns S-F and S-W in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 contain the value of the test 
statistics from these two tests and the p-value columns contain the p-values for each 
corresponding test statistic. 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates, 
combined 2001-2013 
 
 
4.4. Results and Discussion  
Results of our analysis using the methodology explained in the previous section 
indicate a strong presence of budgetary punctuation in the budgets of the states of India. 
In Fig.4.1, we present the distribution of the annual percentage changes of budgeted 
expenditures in all categories for all states, for the entire sample period. The ‘rug’ above 
the histogram indicates the frequency of each observed percentage change values 
(measured along the horizontal axis). The continuous curve is indicative of a normal 
distribution with same mean and standard deviation. A simple visual inspection of this 
figure tells us that the distribution of changes in budgetary expenditure is not normal. 
Similar distribution of the aggregate data has been observed for other countries as well 
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(for example, Mortensen, 2005, p. 941 for Danish local budget; Breunig et. al. 2009, p. 9, 
for USA). The distribution shows classic signs of leptokurtosis. If the budget changes 
were normally distributed then we would see approximately around 68.26% of the 
observations to fall within one standard deviation of the mean. In our sample, 89.72% 
observations lie between plus and minus one standard deviation of the mean. On the other 
hand for a normal distribution only 0.26% of the observations should lie outside the range 
of plus and minus three standard deviations from the mean. However, in our sample 
around 1.79% of the observations lie outside this boundary. As a result there are 
relatively far less observations in the range of one standard deviation to three standard 
deviation. Breunig et. al. (2009) defines any change greater than 50% as “massive 
increases”. In the present sample, 8.24% of the observations satisfy this criterion. Thus at 
a combined level the state budgetary changes in India shows severe leptokurtic behavior. 
In other words the budgeted expenditure changes at the state level in India are 
characterized by stability which is frequently interrupted by very large punctuations. 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by 
State, 2001-2013) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by 
State, 2001-2013) 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by 
State, 2001-2013) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by 
Category, 2001-2013) 
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This aggregate picture may mask a lot of state to state and category specific 
variation in the pattern of the distribution of annual change. As the next level of 
exploration, we therefore, have plotted the distributions of the annual changes in 
budgeted expenditures for each state (all categories combined) and for each category (for 
all states combined). Figure 4.2 to 4.6 present these distributions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by 
Category, 2001-2013) 
 
 
 
 
Figures 4.2 to 4.3 show that the punctuated nature of budgetary changes is not 
specific to any particular state of India. Some states (Goa, Odhisha, and West Bengal) 
may not have seen any reduction greater than 50 percent, but all states experience 
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increases greater than 50 percent quite frequently. Moreover, figures 4.5 and 4.6 show 
that almost all categories of expenditure exhibit characteristics of leptokurtic distribution. 
Thus the punctuated pattern of annual change is neither driven by any particular state nor 
by any particular category. However, as we will soon discuss there is considerable 
variability in the extent of punctuation for different categories of expenditures. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget Changes in Each State, 
2001-2013 
State Median IQR Kurtosis L-Kurtosis S-F p value S-W p value 
Andhra Pradesh 4.667 19.433 33.805 0.313 0.699 0.000 0.714 0.000 
Bihar 5.332 22.972 42.879 0.411 0.546 0.000 0.561 0.000 
Chhattishgarh 8.277 24.365 47.607 0.367 0.528 0.000 0.542 0.000 
Goa 6.987 18.212 12.788 0.390 0.677 0.000 0.684 0.000 
Gujarat 3.739 19.009 11.606 0.328 0.830 0.000 0.842 0.000 
Haryana 4.880 17.461 19.278 0.359 0.692 0.000 0.703 0.000 
Jharkhand 4.059 31.852 24.863 0.366 0.672 0.000 0.686 0.000 
Karnataka 5.887 21.548 11.584 0.307 0.837 0.000 0.846 0.000 
Kerala 4.567 20.855 8.874 0.328 0.874 0.000 0.885 0.000 
Maharashtra 4.120 19.546 18.307 0.524 0.529 0.000 0.537 0.000 
Madhya Pradesh 6.045 15.449 22.464 0.394 0.668 0.000 0.680 0.000 
Odhisha 5.946 25.186 12.353 0.309 0.780 0.000 0.788 0.000 
Punjab 0.343 19.419 17.315 0.492 0.604 0.000 0.612 0.000 
Rajasthan 2.220 19.502 25.966 0.379 0.674 0.000 0.690 0.000 
Tamil Nadu 4.775 17.689 39.609 0.403 0.626 0.000 0.641 0.000 
Uttar Pradesh 2.093 19.601 32.283 0.497 0.503 0.000 0.517 0.000 
Uttarakhand 4.211 21.193 51.163 0.474 0.498 0.000 0.513 0.000 
West Bengal 2.752 15.209 24.423 0.342 0.761 0.000 0.775 0.000 
Total 4.470 19.92 44.035 0.407 0.605 0.000 0.606 0.000 
S-F: Shapiro-Francia, S-W: Shapiro-Wilk, IQR: Inter Quartile Range 
   
 
 
To bolster these conclusions reached by a simple visual inspection of the data we 
have provided the relevant numerical measures that characterize the distributions and the 
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results of the formal tests of normality in tables 4.1 and 4.2. Once we leave the realm of 
Gaussian or Normal distribution the popular measures – mean and standard deviation – 
lose much of their sheen. Therefore, following the extant literature we have provided two 
other measures of central tendency and dispersion – the median and the interquartile 
range. Moreover, since the regular Kurtosis measure is not well behaved in the presence 
of outliers (which is the case with our sample), we have computed the L-kurtosis for the 
annual percentage changes – for each state (all categories combined) and for each 
category (all states combined). As can be seen from table 1, the overall distribution of 
budget changes in each state is characterized by leptokurtosis – L-Kurtosis values far 
higher than 0.12 which corresponds to a Normal distribution. However, the leptokurtosis 
is far less strong in categories of expenditure like Education, Health, and Police than in 
categories like Labor, Irrigation and Rural Development. This is even more starkly 
presented in Figure 4. The last four columns of table 4.1 and 4.2 present the results of the 
tests of Normality. As we can see from the associated p-values of each test, the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution can be easily rejected in each of them. Statistics 
literature argues that one should not only depend on the numerical tests for testing 
normality of any data series. Following this suggestion, we have created the Q-plots for 
each state and for each category (all states combined). These are presented in Appendix 
B. Combining these results and diagrams I can conclude that the budgetary changes in 
each state and in each category exhibits punctuations. 
  
100 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget Changes in Each 
Expenditure Category, 2001-2013 
Expenditure 
Categories Median IQR Kurtosis 
L-
Kurtosis S-F 
p 
value S-W 
p 
value 
Labor 2.167 20.959 23.571 0.414 0.622 0.000 0.631 0.000 
Irrigation 1.937 15.238 23.743 0.408 0.652 0.000 0.661 0.000 
Rural 
Development 6.369 28.248 21.870 0.382 0.681 0.000 0.689 0.000 
Urban 
Development 8.231 43.911 14.928 0.369 0.667 0.000 0.671 0.000 
Roads 2.532 33.137 13.445 0.346 0.749 0.000 0.755 0.000 
Water 1.752 23.613 17.952 0.345 0.788 0.000 0.798 0.000 
Social Security 10.070 25.506 19.203 0.329 0.691 0.000 0.699 0.000 
Administration 4.211 19.186 8.522 0.254 0.906 0.000 0.912 0.000 
Agriculture 5.536 23.414 9.125 0.244 0.897 0.000 0.906 0.000 
Health 3.900 12.327 31.381 0.230 0.765 0.000 0.776 0.000 
Police 4.978 11.533 8.070 0.225 0.894 0.000 0.900 0.000 
Education 4.674 13.546 4.344 0.193 0.949 0.000 0.951 0.000 
S-F: Shapiro-Francia, S-W: Shapiro-Wilk, IQR: Inter Quartile Range 
(Ordered according to L-Kurtosis Value) 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: L-Kurtosis for All Expenditure Categories, 
All States combined, 2001-2013 
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Both table 4.2 and Fig. 4.7 show (and also the Fig. 4.5, and 4.6) that certain 
categories of expenditure exhibit more leptokurtic nature or punctuated nature than other 
categories. Education, Police, Health, Agriculture, and Administration shows lower 
values of L-Kurtosis compared to Labor, Irrigation, Rural Development and Urban 
Development. The top five categories in Fig. 4.7 constitute areas where the wage and 
salary component is very high. The employees in schools and colleges, police, hospitals 
and health centers, and government administration are organized into strong labor and 
employee unions. Expenditure on the category ‘Agriculture’ creates a strong vested 
interest group in rural sector which are crucial for electoral fortunes. On the other hand 
spending categories like Labor, Irrigation, Rural and Urban Development, although may 
be economically very important, but does not create well defined beneficiary groups. 
Most of these tasks are undertaken by private contractors under government tender which 
means the workers do not constitute strong labor unions either. However, due to changing 
natural fortunes of Monsoon (annual rainy season in India) flood and draught issues make 
spending categories like Irrigation hit the macro-political agenda at regular intervals 
which results in more punctuations in this type of categories. According to Baumgartner 
and Jones, such interest configurations results in more stasis in the former group of 
categories, while relatively more punctuations in the latter. 
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4.5. Are There Competing Explanations  
Thus far we have shown that even being a developing country, far away from the 
sample of countries – both socially and economically – that has generally been subjected 
to punctuated equilibrium studies till now, Indian state budgets conform to the pattern 
exhibited and explained by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. However, it is not necessary 
that large annual changes be indicative of bounded rationality and disproportionate 
information processing by the political system of the type that underlines the Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory. Such large changes may simply be reactions of the budget officers 
(Finance Department Officials) to previous year’s wrong forecasts. It might simply be the 
case that if for any category the gap between Revised Estimates and Budget Estimates of 
the immediately preceding year is large and positive (realized expenditure greater than 
what budgeted) then the officials allocate a larger sum for that category compared to last 
year’s budget. Since Revised Estimates are results of ex post economic condition of the 
economy therefore, in this scenario budgetary punctuations can actually be explained by 
the economic condition of the previous year, rather than disproportionate information 
processing of the officials and policy makers. 
Large punctuated changes may also be the result of political exigencies like state 
legislative elections. Sitting governments have clear objective of being reelected. The 
most prominent ways it can capture the imagination of the state citizens is by spending 
more during elections years (and may be one year prior to the election year). Thus the 
large changes in budgeted expenditure may be because of election years. 
Just as sitting governments have interest of being reelected and thus may be found 
to spend more during election years, similarly, the opposition parties also make populist 
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promises of higher spending in several sectors during the political campaign. Thus if the 
opposition comes to power in a state election, the year following the state election may 
see large increases in budgeted expenditures. If the years around the state election years 
see large changes in budgetary allocations, then such changes are better explained by the 
political needs of the parties rather than bounded rationality of the budgetary decision 
makers. 
Finally, large changes in Revenue Expenditure may be the result of large Capital 
Expenditures in the same sectors in a prior year. Additional capital expenditure in a 
previous year creates new employment and other avenues of expenditures which the 
Revenue Expenditure of subsequent years must account for. In such cases, the observed 
punctuated changes in the Revenue Expenditure would be the explained by the Capital 
Expenditure.  
To test the importance of these counter explanations I estimate the following 
model. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Where the dependent variable is the change in budgetary expenditure for state i in year t. 
The first explanatory variable election is a dummy variable. We have tested two different 
versions of this variable. In the first version this variable is one for election years, and 
zero for every other year. In the second version this variable is one for the election years, 
the year preceding the election year and the year following the election year. Gap is the 
revised expenditure and budgeted expenditure gap of the previous year. The variable 
cap_score is the annual percentage change in capital expenditure in the same sector in the 
previous year. Not all capital expenditure figures were available and due to this data 
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limitation we have estimated the above model for Education, Health, Water Supply, 
Urban and Rural Development, General Government Administration and Irrigation. Once 
the models are estimated, we compute the residuals. If the residuals still exhibit 
leptokurtic distribution then we can conclude that these counter explanations are not 
valid. The models are estimated as fixed effect models. The results are presented in table 
4.3 and 4.4. 
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Table 4.3: Fixed Effect Estimation Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
Education Education Health Health Urban Dev. Urban Dev. Water Supply Water Supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Election Year 
Dummy 
 
4.308 
(1.689)** 
 
3.773 
(1.601)*** 
 
13.156 
(20.258) 
 
-5.845 
(11.657) 
 
Election Year 
and one year 
on either side 
dummy 
 
 
-1.252 
(1.5) 
 
0.779 
(1.369) 
 
35.297 
(17.080)** 
 
7.611 
(9.697) 
Change in 
Capital 
Expenditure in 
previous year 
 
-0.002 
(.003) 
-0.002 
(.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.0003 
(0.0001)** 
0.0003 
(0.0001)** 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
-0.0008 
(0.003) 
Revised 
Estimates-
Budget 
Estimates Gap 
.790 
(.089)*** 
.796 
(.094)*** 
0.791 
(0.855)*** 
0.781 
(0.087)*** 
0.478 
(0.142)** 
0.466 
(0.142)** 
1.316 
(0.22)*** 
1.321 
(0.219)*** 
Overall R2 .28 .25 .29 .27 .11 0.12 0.17 0.17 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Estimation Results (Cont.) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Rural Dev. Rural Dev. Government 
Administration 
Government 
Administration 
Irrigation Irrigation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Election Year 
Dummy 
 
13.654 
(8.281) 
 
2.507 
(3.285) 
 
0.341 
(3.055) 
 
Election Year and 
one year on either 
side 
 
 
9.48 
(6.767) 
 
-0.602 
(2.759) 
 
-1.428 
(2.637) 
Change in Capital 
Expenditure in 
previous year 
 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.015 
(0.033) 
Revised Estimates-
Budget Estimates 
Gap 
1.117 
(0.145)*** 
1.167 
(0.143)*** 
1.145 
(0.12)*** 
1.135 
(0.121)*** 
0.987 
(0.108)*** 
.999 
(0.11)*** 
Overall R2 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.31 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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The estimated models explain varied amounts of the total variation in the annual 
percentage change in budgetary expenditures. The variation is quite dramatic across 
different spending categories. On the one hand we have Education, Health and Irrigation 
where twenty five percent or more of the total overall variation is explained by the model. 
On the other we have Urban Development where this percentage comes down to around 
eleven. Although we have presented the standard errors in the parenthesis, but unless the 
residuals are proved to be normally distributed the tests of significance are meaningless. 
The gap between revised and budget estimates in the previous year seems to explain a 
large part of the explained variation. For every one percent increase in the gap, budgetary 
expenditure in the current year seem to increase by around 79 percentage points for 
Education and Health, 48 percentage points for Urban Development, and by more than 
100 percentage points for Water Supply and Rural Development. Thus, forecast error in 
previous year seems to affect the budgetary changes to a large extent. It appears that in 
the sample, other than water supply, all types of expenditure increases in the election 
years. However, there is not much evidence to support the hypothesis that expenditure 
changes that much in the year preceding and following the state election. 
The gap between the revised and budget estimates in the previous year seem to 
explain a substantial part of the explained variation in the annual budgetary change. 
However, what is more important is the distribution of the residuals once this effect is 
taken care off. In table 4.5 we present the L-kurtosis value of the residuals along with the 
Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests of normality. The L-kurtosis values are still much 
higher than 0.12 which is the L-Kurtosis value of the normal distribution. Both the 
Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests reject the null hypothesis of normality of the 
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residuals at least at five percent level of significance for each type of expenditure. Thus 
the residuals still exhibit leptokurtic distributions. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Test of Normality Results for the Estimated Residuals 
Residual of Model L-Kurtosis S-F p-value S-W p-value 
Education Model 1 0.232 0.8667 0 0.85625 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.199 0.88358 0 0.87259 0.00001 
Health Model 1 0.164 0.98104 0.01118 0.98101 0.01268 
 
Model 2 0.166 0.97339 0.00106 0.97296 0.00147 
Urban Development Model 1 0.447 0.61023 0 0.59568 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.411 0.62433 0 0.61045 0.00001 
Water Supply Model 1 0.398 0.45231 0 0.43546 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.406 0.45246 0 0.4355 0.00001 
Rural Development Model 1 0.345 0.74425 0 0.73119 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.335 0.73352 0 0.72014 0.00001 
Administration Model 1 0.225 0.91419 0 0.90735 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.221 0.91978 0 0.91314 0.00001 
Irrigation Model 1 0.298 0.77749 0 0.76341 0.00001 
 
Model 2 0.293 0.7916 0 0.77830 0.00001 
 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this paper we set out to test the applicability of the Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory of budgetary change using data from Indian state budgets. The results presented 
in this paper demonstrate that the annual budget changes in Indian States exhibit both 
stasis and punctuations. The distribution of these changes can easily be seen to be more 
leptokurtic than the Gaussian distribution. These findings are observed across states and 
across spending categories. The degree of punctuation (or leptokurtosis) is larger in 
spending categories where the beneficiaries are not well defined or formally organized in 
politically important interest groups. We also tested some alternative explanations to the 
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observed punctuated pattern of budgetary changes in the Indian state budgets. We found 
that forecast error correction explain a part of this pattern. However, even after 
accounting for the forecast error correction, we are still left with large residual leptokurtic 
variation in annual change in the budget. Thus the primary findings in this paper extend 
the existing literature on budgetary punctuation developed for countries like USA, UK, 
Germany, Denmark and France to India. Therefore, it seems that punctuated equilibrium 
theory can describe the behavior of budgetary policy even in developing parliamentary 
democracies like India. 
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Appendix A: Definitions and Source of Variables for Tax Interaction 
Analysis 
 
 
  
Variable Definition Source 
EATR Effective Average Tax Rate. 
Computed following the 
definition of Devereux and 
Griffith (1998). 
Computed from tax rate data 
collected from AEI tax 
database. Other required 
variables in the computation 
were collected from World 
Bank Open Database. 
STR Top statutory tax rate. AEI tax database for tax rates. 
Dependency Ratio Ratio of young (less than 14 
years) and old (older than 65 
years) people to working age (14-
64 years) population. 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Population 
Density 
Population per sq. KM. World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Government 
Expenditure 
Government final consumption 
expenditure. 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Openness Total of export and import as a 
percentage of GDP. 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Per capita real 
GDP 
Real GDP (in 2005 US$) divided 
by total population 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Urban Population Proportion of population living in 
urban areas. 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
Rent from Natural 
Resources 
Rent from Natural Resources as 
percentage of GDP. 
World Bank Open Database 
and World Bank Development 
Indicator Database. 
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Appendix B: Q-Normal Plots of Annual Changes in Budget Estimates 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013) 
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Figure B.2: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013) 
  
120 
 
 
Figure B3: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013) 
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Figure B.4: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By Category, 2001-
2013) 
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Figure B.5: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By Category, 2001-
2013) 
 
